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Mandatory Process
MATTHEW J.B. LAWRENCE*
This Article suggests that people tend to undervalue their procedural rights—their
proverbial “day in court”—until they are actually involved in a dispute. The Article
argues that the inherent, outcome-independent value of participating in a dispute
resolution process comes largely from its power to soothe a person’s grievance—
their perception of unfairness and accompanying negative emotional reaction—win
or lose. But a tendency to assume unchanging emotional states, known in behavioral
economics as projection bias, can prevent people from anticipating that they might
become aggrieved and from appreciating the grievance-soothing power of process.
When this happens, people will waive their procedural rights too freely.
This conclusion undermines the freedom-of-contract rationale for trusting parties
to make their own pre-dispute choices about the availability of dispute resolution
process. Contributing to the second, more paternalistic wave of “hard” behavioral
economics (recommending mandates, not nudges), this Article identifies
circumstances under which the threat of behavioral market failure justifies a law
mandating the procedural protections that people must “buy” before a dispute
arises, whether they want to or not.
This behavioral approach to understanding the value of process and when it
should be mandatory has implications throughout the law. This Article shows how
the behavioral approach leads to specific interventions for mandatory process in
health insurance, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the constitutional right to
due process, and Medicare contractor agreements.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, a patient whose health insurer refused to cover some treatment or
service—say in vitro fertilization, gastric bypass, a CAT scan, or anything else—had little
recourse to challenge that decision. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) had taken away but not replaced state courts’ common law authority to
second-guess such utilization review decisions, which left patients “unprotected.”1 Court
after court lamented this problematic state of affairs and called on Congress to fix it.2
Eventually, though, states started to address this gap by mandating that insurers
offer disappointed patients access to timely, external, independent review of
decisions denying coverage, at the insurer’s expense.3 The Affordable Care Act
(ACA) extended this patchwork throughout the land, mandating that every private
insurance plan in every state offer such an external review process.4 In health
insurance, process is now mandatory.
By most accounts this is a happy ending,5 but there is something missing from
this story. If procedural rights were and are so valuable to patients, why did states
(and eventually Congress) have to step in to get them those rights? Why didn’t the
health insurance contract simply provide for them? Why were courts so quick to
assume (apparently correctly) that the common law process rights taken away by
ERISA could be replaced only by state or federal mandate, and not by contract?
This puzzle invites a larger question: When should the law regulate process by
mandate? The question arises again and again throughout the law: in civil procedure,6

1. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 62 (D. Mass. 1997).
2. Id.; e.g. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (“I also join ‘the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit
what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.’” (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, 346 U.S. 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
3. See generally Katherine T. Vukadin, Hope or Hype: Why the Affordable Care Act’s
New External Review Rules for Denied ERISA Healthcare Claims Need More Reform, 60
BUFF. L. REV 1201 (2012).
4. Id. at 1203.
5. See id.; see also Dustin D. Berger, The Management of Health Care Costs:
Independent Medical Review After “ObamaCare”, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 255 (2011); Roy F.
Harmon, An Assessment of New Appeals and External Review Processes—ERISA Claimants
Get “Some Kind of a Hearing,” 56 S.D. L. REV. 408 (2011); Eleanor D. Kinney,
Administrative Law Protections in Coverage Expansions for Consumers Under Health
Reform, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 33, 60–64 (2011) (discussing procedures).
6. E.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1342–52 (2012) (discussing current law on enforcement of
agreements to alter rules of procedure in federal and state court); Kevin E. Davis & Helen
Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 527 (2011) (discussing
lack of information as a reason to doubt that choice about procedure reflects best interest of
parties); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 734–
38 (2011) (discussing enforcement of procedural contracts in federal court); Judith Resnik,
Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 613 (2005) (discussing amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that expressly listed facilitating settlement as a goal of
pretrial conferences).
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in tort,7 in constitutional law,8 in arbitration law,9 in contract law,10 and elsewhere.
Indeed, the Supreme Court confronts questions about whether to mandate process
nearly every term.11
This Article offers a novel answer to this question, a behavioral approach to
understanding the inherent value of the “product” that is dispute resolution process
and whether its “purchase” should be mandatory. Based on research in behavioral
economics and procedural justice, this approach offers an account of whether and
when people should be trusted to contract over procedure. Advancing the second
wave of “hard” behavioral economics that explores when biases justify not “nudges”
but mandates, the Article identifies the conditions under which the law should
“mandate process” by dictating the procedures that must be available to resolve a
dispute, even if both parties agree otherwise before the dispute arises.
Here is a précis of the behavioral approach offered in this Article, in two steps:
First, many people confronted with an adverse outcome, like the denial of their

7. E.g., Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue
& Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1227 (2003) (discussing tort reforms
allowing purchasers of automobile insurance to decide ex ante whether to contract for a full
right to sue); Antonios P. Tsarouhas, Bowen v. Kil–Kare, Inc.: The Derivative and
Independent Approach to Spousal Consortium, 19 OH. N. U. L. REV. 987, 994 (1993) (arguing
that application of waiver of liability to spouse’s consortium claim would “deny the spouse
her day in court”).
8. E.g., Antinore v. State, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (enforcing collective
bargaining agreement that limited due process rights).
9. Compare United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 698 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(writing that due process would not allow parties to “flip a coin” to resolve dispute), with 10
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/23-27 (West 2010) (mandating that in case of tie, election be resolved
by lottery), and Norman L. Balmer, An Innovator’s Prospective on Judicial Management in
the United States, 9 FED. CIR. B. J. 615, 618 (2000) (“[W]e have heard of patent disputes being
resolved as a wager on a friendly game of golf or a flip of the coin. It is cost effective and it
quickly eliminates uncertainty.”), and Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in
Contract, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1444 (2009) (“[F]rom an economic perspective it is preferable
to resolve an honest dispute over the amount of a debt by a flip of a coin, for this resolution
minimizes litigation costs with no clear sacrifice on other dimensions of behavior.”), and
Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2009)
(discussing randomized outcomes in the judicial system).
10. E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); see also Palomar Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 693 F.3d
1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 2012) (allowing no judicial review of reopening determinations); ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
11. The Supreme Court’s decisions enforcing the contractually-set limitations period in
Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013), and requiring
arbitration of the non-compete agreement in Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard, 133 S.
Ct. 500 (2012), are two recent examples. As seen in both those cases and many others, the
Court tends to rule against mandatory process; that is, it has tended to approve pre-dispute
agreements regarding parties’ procedural rights, usually by application of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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request for health insurance coverage, accept the outcome, deal with their
disappointment, and move on. But sometimes a loss sticks, we perceive an outcome
as unfair, and we “grieve” as a result. The inherent value of participating in a dispute
resolution process comes in part from its power to soothe such a grievance when it
does occur, win or lose. The ancient Egyptians knew that “[a] good hearing soothes
the heart”12; or as Justice Frankfurter put it, due process “generat[es] the feeling, so
important to a popular government, that justice has been done.”13 More recently,
Tom Tyler and others have offered experimental research into procedural justice
consistent with the power of fair process to generate acceptance even without
changing outcomes.14 Thus, it may be correct to view process as a commodity, but it
is a special kind. Its value to us depends on our suffering a grievance—an emotional
response that can be difficult to predict—and comes not only from satisfying our
preferences but from altering them.15
Second, people can fail to appreciate this grievance-soothing value of
participating in a dispute resolution process until they actually suffer a grievance.
Research in behavioral economics indicates that people tend to underestimate
changes in their own emotional states; behavioral economists call this tendency
“projection bias.”16 Where present, projection bias “mean[s] that people wrongly
project their current emotional state onto their future selves.”17 (So, for example, a
hungry shopper assumes she will be hungry when it comes time to eat, and buys too

12. PTTAHOTEP, THE INSTRUCTION OF PTAHHOTEP, quoted in JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE
PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, at vii (1985).
13. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. E.g., Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science
Perspective on Civil Procedural Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871 (1997).
15. As a result, dispute resolution process is better understood as belonging to a special
category of preference-altering commodities, such as addictive drugs or gastric bypass
surgery. Instead of generating addiction (as with drugs) or satiation (as with gastric bypass),
dispute resolution generates acceptance.
16. George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in
Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q. J. OF ECON. 1209, 1211–12 (2003) (“We believe that
projection bias is important for many economic applications, and that it can provide an
intuitive and parsimonious account for many phenomena that are otherwise difficult to
explain.”) [hereinafter Lowenstein et al., Projection Bias]; see also George Loewenstein
& Erik Angner, Predicting and Indulging Changing Preferences, in TIME AND DECISION 351,
353 (George Loewenstien et al., eds., 2003).
17. Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 303, 323
(2007) [hereinafter Sunstein, Willingness]. The term “projection bias” has not always been
used consistently since the label was offered by Loewenstein. On occasion, it has been used
to imply simply that people do not correctly forecast how they will feel about things, regardless
of whether the reason for such an error is their failure to anticipate an altered preference state
or some other cause. This broader possibility is known as “affective forecasting,” a general
term that includes several biases, of which projection bias is one. Id. at 305; see also Cass R.
Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826,
1831 (2013). The term “projection bias” is used here in the more narrow sense in which
Loewenstein (and Sunstein) employed it, that is, a failure to correctly forecast changes in one’s
own emotional state. See infra notes 103–108 and accompanying text.
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much food.) A person susceptible to projection bias, then, will underestimate the
value of participating in a dispute resolution process ex ante, either by failing to
appreciate that she may come to suffer a grievance (it is one thing to be subjected to
a loss, quite another to suffer a grievance) or by failing to appreciate the
grievance-soothing power of process. Either way, she will contract for too little
process, potentially justifying a mandate.18
A stylized example of the behavioral approach at work: Imagine a tenant subject
to projection bias negotiating over the terms of a lease. At this point, she will fail to
appreciate that she could come to despise her landlord for, say, raising her rent. She
will also fail to anticipate that, should she suffer such a grievance, pursuing a dispute
resolution process like mediation or housing court could ease her bitterness, whether
she gets her rent lowered or not. As a result, she will undervalue her procedural rights
at the time she signs her lease and it may, under circumstances discussed in the
Article, be appropriate for the law to mandate the dispute resolution process that
governs her dispute rather than leave that question for the landlord and tenant to
decide in the lease.
This Article is the first to apply behavioral economic tools to model the inherent
value of dispute resolution process or to analyze the “market” therefor. The resulting
behavioral approach to the value of the “day in court” and the desirability of
mandatory process is the Article’s primary contribution.
The Article also makes three additional, secondary contributions. First, this
Article is one of the first to explore the implications of projection bias for the design
of legal rules. Unlike optimism, the availability heuristic, and other biases also
revealed by research in behavioral economics, projection bias has with limited
exception not found its way into behavioral law and economics; indeed Cass Sunstein
has said that “it is not clear how or whether public officials should react to the
possibility of projection bias.”19 One reason that scholars in behavioral law and
economics have so far been hesitant to explore the implications of projection bias
may be that, unlike many other biases, it can be especially difficult to fix a behavioral
market failure that is caused by projection bias with a choice-respecting “nudge”

18. Just as behavioral economics might justify a prohibition on the purchase of addictive
drugs because people fail to anticipate the adverse alteration to their preferences such drugs
can cause, Loewenstein et al., supra note 16, at 1211 (“A stressed undergraduate who
underappreciates the addictiveness of cigarettes . . . might start smoking with the plan of
quitting upon graduation, only to continue smoking after graduation once she becomes
addicted.”), the law should in many situations mandate the purchase of process because people
fail to anticipate the benign alteration caused by the right to a “day in court.” The commodities
and effects may be very different, but the behavioral bias that creates market failure—and
justifies a restriction on choice—is not. See infra Part II.B.
19. Sunstein, Willingness, supra note 17, at 324. The primary exception is arguments
about the usefulness of “cooling off” periods. See generally Camerer et al., supra note 7, at
1238–40. Such inquiries address projection bias only to the extent that it prevents a person in
a “hot” state from predicting that they might cool down, not to the extent that it prevents a
person in a “cool” state from predicting that they might enter a “hot” state. See infra note 109
and accompanying text.
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such as a disclosure rule or default rule, making a liberty-respecting (and so
unobjectionable) policy fix difficult.20
Second, and relatedly, Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes note in their article, How
Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, that behavioral economic research
is capable of supporting more forceful interventions than those recommended by the
first wave of behavioral law and economics.21 This Article advances the second, hard
wave of behavioral law and economic scholarship called for by Bubb and Pildes,
going “beyond nudges” to explore in a particular and especially important context
the degree to which behavioral biases support a mandatory rule.22 Process mandates
are not as normatively problematic as ordinary mandates, the Article points out,
because they are ultimately choice preserving. Process mandates deprive both parties
of a choice ex ante (to forego process), but offer the aggrieved party a choice ex post
she would not otherwise have had (to sue).
Third, the behavioral approach has implications for whether to mandate process
in specific areas throughout the law. A comprehensive analysis of every potential
process mandate is beyond the scope of this Article. But the Article engages specific
interventions in four areas in order to illustrate the usefulness of the behavioral
approach: (1) the behavioral approach can be used to defend the Affordable Care
Act’s “process mandate”—the requirement that health insurers offer beneficiaries
external review of decisions denying coverage—and thereby solve the puzzle that
opened the Article; (2) we should be especially reluctant to enforce contractual
agreements altering the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent that they make
it harder to bring a case simply because it is likely to lose (such as by raising the
pleading standard or limiting discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss)
or to appear in person (such as by forcing the plaintiff to litigate in a distant forum);
(3) we should be loathe to permit claimants to waive their constitutional rights to due
process prior to deprivations of “new” property; and (4) Medicare should consider
requiring the insurers that it does business with to waive their procedural rights. This
Article offers the first intervention in order to demonstrate how the behavioral
approach can explain process mandates, the second to situate the behavioral approach
in a lively literature addressed to mandatory process in civil procedure, the third for
its constitutional significance, and the fourth to illustrate the capacity of the
behavioral approach to counsel against mandatory process.
Part I discusses the features and functions of dispute resolution process,
understood as a commodity. Part II begins by discussing limitations of the
proceduralist and economic approaches to understanding the value of process and
when the predispute “purchase” of this commodity should be mandatory. Part II then
goes on to offer a conception of the inherent, outcome-independent value of process

20. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009); see also Camerer et al., supra note 7, at 1239
(“Cooling-off periods appear more intrusive than our earlier policies, and should thus be
implemented with much greater reticence and only after careful analysis.”).
21. Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why,
127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1595 (2014) (“Put simply, it would be surprising if the main policy
implication of the mounting evidence documenting the failure of individual choice was a turn
toward regulatory instruments that preserve individual choice.”).
22. See id. at 1658.
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as coming from its capacity to soothe grievances—especially negative emotional
reactions to adverse events—and identifies projection bias as a behavioral market
failure that may keep people from appreciating this value of the “day in court” ex
ante, before suffering a grievance. In short, it shows that behavioral market failure
could cause people to contract for too few procedural protections.
Part III explores the conditions under which the possibility that some people may
fail to value their day in court ex ante actually supports a process mandate. This
inquiry is necessary for any behavioral economic analysis because our susceptibility
to behavioral biases is heterogeneous and because mandates come with unavoidable
costs, so the mere possibility that a behavioral bias is present does not automatically
counsel in favor of a mandate (or even a nudge). But, Part III shows, the knowledge
problems that have stood in the way of “hard” behavioral economics are not as
problematic for process mandates because process mandates are an example of what
the Article labels choice-preserving mandates, that is, laws that force us to keep our
options open. Such laws are not unambiguously liberty restricting; they restrict liberty
ex ante, but increase liberty ex post. This distinction offers an answer to prominent
functional and welfare-based libertarian objections to government intervention, and so
puts mandatory process requirements (and other choice-preserving mandates) on a
stronger normative footing than purely restrictive mandates.
Part IV discusses implications. Anytime the law might dictate that more (or
different) process be available for resolving a potential dispute between two parties
than the parties would set by agreement, the decision whether to do so would benefit
from consideration of the behavioral approach put forward in this Article. Four
particular implications for open questions of process policy—about where to
mandate process, where not to, what process to mandate in federal court, and whether
to treat the Due Process Clause as a mandate—illustrate the point. Finally, the Article
ends with a brief Conclusion.
I. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS AS A COMMODITY
Commodities can be described by their functions and form, and dispute
resolution process is no different (although, as this Article will show, dispute
resolution is no ordinary commodity).23 This Part briefly describes the essential
and optional features of dispute resolution process, as well as its functions. This
discussion sets the stage for the discussion in the next two Parts of how to
understand the value of process and the behavioral case for forcing people to “buy”
procedural protections that they do not want.
As used here, dispute resolution process (or just “process”) means any mechanism
by which a party aggrieved by a decision may air his or her grievance after the fact
and, perhaps, obtain reversal or some other relief. So, broadly understood, the
irreducible features of dispute resolution process are (1) claimant participation and
(2) some possibility of relief, often either reversal or compensation.24 Remedial

23. Cf. Tom Ginsburg, 2013 Coase Lecture, Constitutions as Products, UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/audio/ginsburg021213
(analyzing constitutions in light of their features and useful functions).
24. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364
(1978) (discussing participation and review by a decision maker as essential features of
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processes fitting this description are everywhere, from the process your credit card
company offers for you to dispute charges, to the NFL’s instant replay system (before
the final two minutes, when a different review mechanism is used), to the
adjudication of a constitutional case in federal court.25
This definition contrasts dispute resolution process with other mechanisms by
which parties might agree to enforce their rights or provide relief vis à vis one
another. For example, cases might be identified or brought by third-party
investigators, not individual parties (even if each party has a significant stake in the
prosecution and outcome).26 Similarly, in some cases, parties (including a third
party) could use random sampling of cases, auditing, process controls, or other forms
of oversight—other than individual, claimant-driven appeals—to prevent or identify
incorrect decisions or inappropriate behavior.27 Or a right to sue might be given to
anyone, not just the aggrieved party, as is the case in qui tam lawsuits.28
Dispute resolution process may feature a variety of additional, optional features.
These include: (1) an adversarial proceeding (involving not only the aggrieved but
the party with whose decision the aggrieved takes issue)29; (2) taking of evidence or
building of a record including, perhaps, the disclosure of information (to the parties
or the public)30; (3) ritual (such as the judge’s robes)31; (4) adjudicator independence
(in some cases the adjudicator is the initial decider, while in others, such as federal

adjudication that distinguish it from other means of decision making); Bruce L. Hay,
Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1806 (1997) (noting two
effects of adjudication, a “sorting effect” flowing from the possibility of reversal and a
“process effect[]” flowing from participation by the aggrieved).
25. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Replay, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1683 (2011).
26. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
OEI-04-11-00680, MEDICARE RECOVERY AUDIT CONTRACTORS AND CMS’S ACTIONS TO
ADDRESS IMPROPER P AYMENTS, REFERRALS OF P OTENTIAL FRAUD, AND P ERFORMANCE
(2013) (describing program incentivizing third-party contractors to pursue Medicare
appeals on behalf of government).
27. See, e.g., Palomar Medical Center v. Sebelius, 693 F.3d 1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding there was “nothing arbitrary or capricious” about agency’s decision to enforce
compliance with regulations “internally rather than through provider appeals”); cf. Steven
Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995)
(discussing conditions under which error correction mechanisms other than ex post appeal are
more cost effective); Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649
(2000) (presenting model in which optimal design of auditing procedures depends on whether
errors of initial decision maker are intentional or accidental). See generally William B.
Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 2129 (2004) (discussing role of claimants in enforcing public goals).
28. See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:
Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation under the False Claims Act, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1706–11 (2013) (discussing basics of qui tam lawsuits).
29. On inquisitorial versus adversarial systems generally, see, for example, Pauline
Houlden, Stephen LaTour, Laurens Walker & John Thibaut, Preference for Modes of Dispute
Resolution as a Function of Process and Decision Control, 14 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 13 (1978).
30. Compare, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (describing on-the-record review of
administrative agency action), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (governing discovery in federal civil
proceedings).
31. OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL (2005).

2015]

MANDATORY PROCESS

1437

court, extensive protections are employed to ensure independence)32; (5) reason
giving by the adjudicator, either oral or in writing, including, perhaps, a system of
precedent33; and (6) cost shifting.
As for the functions of dispute resolution process, the most obvious is the
identification and correction of errors. Simply the threat of reversal can prevent
errors, and each (correct) reversal corrects an error, thereby increasing
compliance with the substantive law (whether the law’s source is contract,
statute, or constitution).34
Indeed, some who have modeled adjudicatory process have posited that
encouraging compliance with the law through the prevention and correction of
noncompliant behaviors is its only valuable function.35 This assumption about the
function of dispute resolution can be seen in general surveys of law and economics
offered by prominent scholars in the field.36 It bears noting that, if that is so, the first
essential feature of adjudicatory process—participation by the aggrieved—is not
actually necessary. Rather, so viewed, litigant selection and prosecution of cases are
just one means to the end of enforcement.

32. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III (mandating independence of federal judges).
33. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995).
34. As used here, an “error” is an outcome different than the legally “correct” one. In tort,
an “error” occurs when a tort-feasor negligently injures a victim without compensation. In
contract, an “error” occurs when a party breaches the terms of the contract without paying
expectation damages to the other party to the contract.
35. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994) (suggesting that reported preference for participation may
reduce to preference for accuracy because accuracy is perceived to be a function of
participation). But see Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 291–97
(2004) (rejecting this view). See generally Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need
for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 323 (2008) (discussing this vision of procedure);
Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 388, 394 (1909) (“[T]he
end of legal procedure is to bring about results in accord with substantive law.”).
36. See THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 235 (2d ed. 2009) (“[T]he
social function of the legal system . . . is to provide incentives for individuals to act in certain
socially desirable ways.”); see also id. at 250 (discussing benefits of ADR focused exclusively
on information sharing and efficiency). The first example in LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2009) of a policy shift that welfare economics would
support is a shift from the current system of tort liability for automobile accidents, in which
victims may sue, to a comprehensive compensation system, in which victims could not sue
but would, on net, be more likely to receive compensation. They say that such a proposal
would be “deemed socially desirable” on a welfare-based approach simply if it had (1) lower
administrative costs and (2) more accurate victim compensation. Id. at 1. Their welfare-based
analysis assumes the only welfare-improving function of tort litigation is error reduction, in
this case, preventing accidents and compensating victims (to be fair, the project of their book
is a normative one; it is not intended to be a complete analysis of this or any policy, but their
framing of the functions of process is nonetheless informative). To be sure, Kaplow and
Shavell recognize that process may serve functions beyond error reduction, see id. at 275–89
(outlining functions of process that have been offered in the literature; not including
grievance-reducing function), but their focus on accuracy is consistent with the focus of most
economic analyses in the field.
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Many believe that adjudicatory process serves valuable functions beyond just
error identification and correction, however.37 Paramount among these is the asserted
inherent, outcome-independent value of participation—the value of the proverbial
“day in court.”
For better or worse, there are nearly as many theories of the value of participation
as there are proponents of such a value.38 The three most prominent are: (1)
satisfaction of a “preference for fairness”39; (2) a legitimizing effect, either for the
court or its decision40; or (3) an autonomy-reaffirming influence that furthers the
individual dignity of the participant.41 The Parts that follow revisit and expand upon
the precise nature of this inherent access value.
II. BEHAVIORAL MARKET FAILURE AND THE DEMAND FOR PROCESS
Mandates are powerful medicine. Even where a mandate has a salutary effect,
such benefit may well be outweighed by the myriad side effects that come along with
any choice-restricting rule. Any mandate takes away people’s freedom of choice, and
that is something we, as individuals or as a society, may value in itself, for a variety
of reasons.42 Furthermore, we generally assume that what people choose is more
efficient than what we mandate, because people are better positioned than
policymakers to know what they want.43
This Part for the first time explores the behavioral economics of mandatory
process requirements—which prevent people from making their own pre-dispute

37. Bone, supra note 35, at 337–39 (“For many proceduralists, outcome quality is not the
only thing that matters in civil adjudication.”).
38. Id. (“There are several different approaches to defining the participation right, but
each has serious difficulties.”); Solum, supra note 35, at 244–73 (discussing three theories of
procedural justice: the accuracy model, the balancing model, and the participation model).
39. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 36; Bone, supra note 35, at 337 (stating the theory
that the intrinistic value of participation is its “tendency to make a party feel that she has been
treated fairly by the process and the outcome”); see also David Rosenberg, Individual Justice
and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210
(1996); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, The Individual Justice of Rationing 47–50 (Olin
Discussion Paper No. 285) (writing that litigant may “derive moral satisfaction from the fact
that the quality of his case is being recognized”).
40. Solum, supra note 35, at 189 (“If the system is seen as illegitimate or without
authority, then the system may fail.”); see also Bone, supra note 35, at 338.
41. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 12; Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell,
Procedural Due Process and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation
Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1880 (2000) (theorizing the day-in-court value as
reflecting “society’s democratic commitment to the precept of process-based autonomy,” with a
value that is “extremely high but not absolute”); see also Bone, supra note 35, at 338.
42. Bone, supra note 35, at 1357–59 (discussing autonomy value as a reason to defer to
party’s choices about process); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law
and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1033, 1068–74 (2012).
43. Bone, supra note 35, at 1355–57 (discussing presumed efficiency benefits of allowing
parties to tailor process by agreement); Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 531; Dodge, supra
note 6, at 725.
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choices about their post-dispute procedural rights—in two senses. First, subpart A
surveys normative arguments in favor of process mandates, relying on the framework
that has been developed in normative behavioral economic scholarship for evaluating
regulations that are based upon their capacity to respect choice (and so “treat” only
those who are subject to bias).44 This survey shows that few arguments have been
advanced that actually support mandating process; most justifications fail actually to
support either a mandate or a process requirement. Others are highly contingent,
limited to, for example, process mandates for the adjudication of constitutional
rights, and therefore are not helpful in evaluating the case for mandatory process
beyond the limited (even if important) context in which they apply.
Subpart B then explores the behavioral economics of process mandates in a
second, descriptive sense. Specifically, it offers a way of understanding the value of
the “day in court” and identifies behavioral market failures that could theoretically
prevent people from adequately considering this value ex ante. It does so by drawing
on qualitative evidence, empirical research on perceptions of procedural justice, and
behavioral economic research on boundedly-rational decision making.
A. Economic and Proceduralist Approaches to Mandatory Process
Process mandates have not escaped scholarly attention. The literature associated
with “contract and procedure” discusses the set of process mandates governing the
procedures applicable to disputes adjudicated in federal court,45 and the arbitration
literature has discussed process mandates dictating minimum conditions for the
enforcement of arbitration clauses.46 These discussions have produced a number of
potential reasons that the law should, in certain circumstances, disregard parties’
choices about process, that is, reasons that the law should mandate process.
Such justifications can roughly be grouped into two categories: (1) economic
justifications, which accept the possibilities that dispute resolution process might
not be worth its cost and that individuals are theoretically capable of making this
cost-benefit tradeoff for themselves; and (2) proceduralist justifications, which
tend to reject these possibilities and focus instead on arguably incommensurable
values of process.
This subpart surveys these justifications, paying particular attention to their
limitations—that is, whether they address mandatory process generally, whether they
really support a mandate or just a nudge, and so on. For the economic approaches,
the focus of doing so is not to demonstrate that these justifications are false or utterly
unable to support a mandatory process requirement under any circumstances.
Instead, the focus is to show that previously articulated economic justifications for
mandatory process are of limited applicability and are often poorly positioned to
justify a process “mandate” rather than a less coercive regulatory response. For the

44. This strain of normative behavioral economics is most often associated with regulatory
instruments viewed to be “asymmetrically paternalistic,” many of which are now commonly
known as choice-respecting “nudges.” For convenience, this Article uses that term.
45. E.g., Hershkoff & Davis, supra note 6.
46. E.g., David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of
Rights Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723 (2012).
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proceduralist approaches, the focus is to explore their underlying bases and identify
their limits as justifications for mandatory process.
1. The Economic Approach to Mandatory Process
The economic justifications for mandatory process can further be sorted into
two categories: those that provide reason to doubt that a party’s choice to go
without a right to adjudicatory process actually reflects that person’s best interests
(faulty choice-based justifications), and those that provide reason to doubt that all
the actual costs and benefits to third parties (or society) of going without process
are reflected in a party’s correct choice about her own best interests
(externality-based justifications).
a. Faulty choice
Scholars have argued that a person’s choice about dispute resolution process does
not necessarily reflect her best interests because (1) the chooser may have inadequate
information and (2) the chooser may have unequal bargaining power,47 especially
when faced with a take-it-or-leave-it standard form contract of the sort common in
consumer contracts.48 Neither justification necessarily supports a mandate.
Inadequate information and information asymmetry can theoretically be
addressed with a disclosure rule—one type of nudge—rather than a choice-restricting
mandate. This is the approach to addressing information asymmetry that has been
offered to solve information problems in credit card contracts, motor vehicle
purchasing contracts, mortgage contracts, cell phone contracts, and so on.49 (To be
sure, disclosure has its own limitations.50) Similarly, an imbalance in bargaining
power created by a standard form contract can be addressed by forcing choice—
forbidding adhesion—rather than mandating the choice preferred by regulators.
Furthermore, the normative force of these justifications is questionable and highly
context dependent. A regulation that protects people from their own inadequate
information discourages learning and future investment in information that might

47. Bone, supra note 6, at 1360–69 (discussing bargaining power objection to enforcing
parties’ agreements about process, collecting sources); Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at
527 (discussing lack of information as a reason to doubt that choice about procedure reflects
best interest of parties).
48. “Concerns about inadequate information are particularly salient when individuals
enter into standard-form contracts with business enterprises without any reasonable
opportunity to consult an attorney.” Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 527.
49. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Pricing Misperceptions: Explaining
Pricing Structure in the Cell Phone Service Market, 9 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 430 (2012); Oren
Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004).
50. See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197
(2008) [hereinafter Willis, Against Financial Literacy]; Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and
the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707
(2006) [hereinafter, Willis, Decisionmaking]; Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education
Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 429 (2011) (pointing to shortcomings of disclosure) [hereinafter
Willis, Financial Education].
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ultimately lead to a more choice-respecting fix.51 Similarly, in a competitive market,
at least, an adhesive contract may nonetheless adequately reflect consumers’ interests
even if only a small number of consumers are aware of the terms. 52 The threat of
exit by even a small number of educated consumers can force a firm to remove an
abusive or unwanted term from a standard form contract, and these consumers can
be educated by competitors’ advertising.53
b. Externalities
Scholars have pointed to several potential negative and positive externalities that
may not be reflected in a person’s pre-dispute choice about the availability of dispute
resolution process.54 When a person’s choice fails to account for such an externality,
the choice loses its presumptive efficiency.55 The potential negative externalities of
going without process (or going with less process) that scholars have identified
include: diminished compliance with the law56; harms to direct third-party
beneficiaries of the potential lawsuit57; a loss of uniformity in the procedures
applicable to disputes58; the potential for violence or self-help by a person unable to
air her grievance; a lost chance for the adjudicator to develop the law through its
application in resolving a dispute59; and a lost chance for the public to learn about
any potential dispute through the development, exchange, and public disclosure of

51. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 529 (“[C]oncerns about inadequate or
asymmetrical information in contracting generally ought to diminish over time as reliance
upon certain types of procedural boilerplate becomes more commonplace, resulting in changes
in contracting parties’ knowledge and expectations.”). But see Dodge, supra note 6, at 761–63
(arguing that learning about procedural terms is unlikely to take place due to, among other
reasons, the difficulty of anticipating procedure’s impact on enforcement of the substantive
law and the requirement of legal knowledge to understand many such terms).
52. Bone, supra note 6, at 1364 & nn.146–48.
53. Id. (reviewing literature).
54. E.g., Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and
Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929 (2003) (discussing negative
externalities as reason to refuse enforcement of medical malpractice exculpatory agreements);
Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6 (arguing for caution in permitting parties to contract ex ante
to change rules of civil procedure because decisions made by private parties may have
“spillovers” that implicate public values); Horton, supra note 46 (discussing negative
externalities as a reason to prevent contracting over procedure); David L. Noll, Rethinking
Anti-Aggregation Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649 (2012) (pointing to externality of
regulatory noncompliance, created by diminished incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to act as
private attorneys general, as a reason courts should refuse to enforce anti-aggregation
agreements in certain circumstances).
55. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 513 (“[P]rivate transactions presumptively
are efficient only if there are no negative externalities, that is to say, no adverse effects
on third parties.”).
56. See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 54; see also Bone, supra note 6, at 1375 n.198.
57. Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 511–13 (2007).
58. Resnik, supra note 6.
59. Bone, supra note 6, at 1377 & n.203.
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an evidentiary record.60 On the other side of the ledger, one positive externality of
the choice to forego process is the potential savings to any government-funded
dispute resolution process of not having to process the potential dispute.61
These externality-based justifications for mandatory process have three
limitations. First, as with the faulty-choice based justifications, none necessarily
supports a mandate. If two parties’ decision to contract around process creates
externalities, then that decision should theoretically be taxed in order to force
internalization of such externalities; the parties should not be prohibited from
contracting around process altogether.62 Hershkoff and Davis’s argument against
contractual alterations to the rules of civil procedure, for example, is that such
agreements should not be enforced when the parties’ procedural change implicates
some public purpose of the procedure system.63 But all else being equal, in such a
case, the optimal rule would force the parties to internalize the cost of such an
externality through a Pigouvian tax or other form of payment, not forbid them from
contracting altogether.64 Otherwise the tail could wag the dog; a small public
externality might be used to justify prohibiting parties from obtaining potentially
large private benefits through contract.
Second, a primary externality-based justification—diminished compliance with
the law—does not actually support mandatory process. Rather, it supports only a
mandatory mechanism for ensuring compliance with the law.65 Ex post dispute
resolution process is only one way to ensure compliance with the law; this end might
also be sought by training and oversight requirements, periodic auditing, public
enforcement of, for example, consumer-protection laws, or reputational sanctions.66
Indeed, ex post process is in many contexts a particularly inefficient error-reduction

60. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 514, 541–48 (“Among the most important”
positive externalities created by process “are various kinds of information that help
policymakers and members of the general public identify and respond to social problems.”);
David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of
Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV.
1085, 1104 (2002); Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 207 (2006).
61. Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around Twombly, 60 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 23–25 (2010). But see Bone, supra note 6, at 1374.
62. For example, parties to arbitration might be required to pay some fraction of any
resulting judgment (or settlement, depending on the externality at issue) to the public court
system, and parties waiving rules of civil procedure might be required to pay some fraction of
any judgment to the court. Or the tax might be imposed as a (very small) flat fee on any
contract waiving particular procedural rights. The former approach would be easier to
implement, but the latter would avoid any distortion of litigation choices.
63. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6.
64. This sort of tax is named for Arthur Cecil Pigou, its best-known proponent. See
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 2002); see also Alex
Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523
(2013) (discussing Pigouvian taxes).
65. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (discussing alternatives to regulatory
process for ensuring compliance with the law).
66. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text; see also Stewart Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963)
(discussing enforcement through reputational sanctions).
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mechanism. The externality-based justification for mandatory process does not allow
for a choice among these regulatory tools, all else being equal, or justify a mandate
rather than a less-choice-restricting nudge, such as a forced choice among equally
effective oversight mechanisms. Furthermore, this externality-based justification
cannot explain common components of mandatory process—like the right to an
in-person hearing or a written explanation from the decision-maker—except insofar
as such components improve accuracy, a questionable proposition.67
Third, these externality-based justifications for certain processes are highly
contingent and context specific. Several apply only in deciding whether to allow
parties to opt out of the federal or state court system for resolving disputes (or make
particular changes to that system), not in deciding whether to mandate process
generally. For example, precedent is a feature of only a subset of dispute resolution
processes (primarily courts)68 and whether the lost opportunity to develop precedent
is in fact a negative externality “depends on one’s theory of adjudication and, in
particular, on what constitutes a good decision as well as a good decision-making
process.”69 That is why we usually allow parties to settle a dispute—whether in
federal court or not—even though doing so deprives the court of the chance to make
law. Indeed, courts following the “passive virtues” abhor the chance to make
precedent, doing so only when parties with a genuine dispute insist that they do so.70
That tendency is at least facially inconsistent with the view that the lost opportunity
to make precedent is a negative externality that could justify a process mandate.
2. The Proceduralist Approach to Mandatory Process
Other scholars argue that adjudicatory process should not be subject to
consequentialist concerns and that procedural rights should be determined by what
is “fair” or “just,” not what is in the best interest of the parties (or third parties).
Sometimes, proceduralist scholars leave the exact nature of this process value
undefined.71 This has caused some to argue that the underlying intuition simply
reflects a preference for fairness.72

67. Some studies have suggested that in-person credibility determinations are in fact not more
accurate. See, e.g., Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827,
837 (2011) (“[V]isually observing witnesses at best contributes nothing to a credibility
determination and at worst increases the likelihood that a fact-finder will get it wrong.”).
68. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 14502(b) (2012) (administrative procedures for resolving
military service members’ disputes about promotion decisions featuring no system of
precedent); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
§ 10101(g) (2010) (procedures for external review of health insurer coverage determination
featuring no system of precedent).
69. Bone, supra note 6, at 1377.
70. Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
71. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 228 n.6 (stating that procedure scholars often
“leave their ideas about fairness implicit”); Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The
Problem With Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 504–18
(2003) (“[D]iscussions of fairness in civil procedure are, with only a few exceptions, rather
thinly developed.”) (internal citations omitted); Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 532
(“[T]he literature does not clearly state what the appropriate criteria of fairness might be.”).
72. See Solum, supra note 35, at 265 n.213. But see Bone, supra note 6, at 505–07
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This lack of clarity does more than open the proceduralist approach up to criticism.
It also makes it difficult to determine the extent to which this justification supports
requiring that certain procedures be available even if both parties to the dispute agree
otherwise ex ante. Yet even the most dogged of proceduralists would surely concede
that there are some situations in which the law should not mandate process.
To remedy this lack of clarity, several scholars have set forth a more precise
definition of the inherent, nonconsequential value of dispute resolution process,
grounding it in dignity, fairness, or other values. As described in the paragraphs that
follow, none of the four most prominent efforts offers a completely satisfactory
account of when the law should mandate process.
a. Mashaw’s Dignity and Due Process
In Due Process and the Administrative State, Jerry Mashaw offers “the best
account of the dignitary value of participatory process,”73 which itself is the
primary deontological theory.74 As Mashaw sees it, giving a person an opportunity
to participate in a decision with which she disagrees is essential to preserving the
autonomy and dignity of that individual. An unfair process creates an affront
“somehow related to disrespect for our individuality, to our not being taken
seriously as persons.”75
Standing alone, Mashaw’s individual-dignity-based theory is not actually an
argument for mandatory process. For that we would need to add to Mashaw’s theory an
argument that individuals are not capable of valuing their own dignity and autonomy, or
of assessing the potential impact of procedural rights thereupon, at the time they agree
to relinquish those rights. The proposition does not speak for itself; if we assume people
are better than policymakers at judging their desire for goods as impersonal as carrots
or cars, then surely we should make the very same assumption when it comes to a
person’s desire for something as profoundly personal as individual dignity.
As discussed in Part II.B, below, the behavioral approach offered in this Article
can be understood as providing an economic basis for such an argument. In this
sense, the behavioral approach integrates the economic approach with Mashaw’s
version of the proceduralist approach.
b. Solum’s Participatory Legitimacy Thesis
Lawrence Solum articulated an oft-cited and carefully-reasoned theory of
procedural justice specifically in order to counter claims that such a value was,

(arguing against this theory of fairness because (1) “[d]efining fairness in terms of feelings
collapses fairness into utility” and (2) doing so means that fairness is no more important than
(and thus, could potentially be outweighed by), people’s preferences for more pedestrian
commodities like roads and schools).
73. Solum, supra note 35, at 262 n.208 (discussing MASHAW, supra note 12).
74. For other expressions of this theory, see, for example, Richard B. Saphire, Specifying
Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 111 (1978).
75. MASHAW, supra note 12, at 163.
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because undefined, illusory.76 His theory is nuanced, but fundamentally based on the
claim that to obligate a person to comply with a decision with which she disagrees—
to give the decision normative legitimacy—we must give the person a right of
participation in the process that brings the outcome about.77 In short, participating in
process makes a losing outcome normatively legitimate even to the loser.
As Solum notes (in not so many words), there is no essential reason that
contracting parties could not appreciate this legitimacy-conferring value of
participation ex ante, and price that value into their decision whether to forego
process.78 Thus, his theory of the value of process does not necessarily counsel in
favor of mandatory process.79 In order to determine the extent to which Solum’s
theory counsels in favor of mandatory process, as with Mashaw’s theory, we need to
explore how (and whether) people account for the power of process to generate
legitimacy ex ante. The behavioral approach offered below offers insight into that
question, but only insofar as bringing a person to be “legitimately bound by
erroneous decisions,” the conclusion with which Solum is concerned,80 is consistent
with the “acceptance” value modeled therein.
c. Bone’s Adjudicatory Legitimacy
Robert Bone articulates his theory of adjudicatory legitimacy in a self-conscious
effort to give content to the intuitive concerns that motivate proceduralists to object
to contracts altering the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—one form of process
mandate—which he calls “party rulemaking.”81 As he puts it, “if party rulemaking is
to be limited or barred in a wider range of cases, it must be because giving parties
control over procedure risks jeopardizing the normative legitimacy of
adjudication.”82 On Bone’s theory, participation by the aggrieved is an essential
prerequisite to the legitimacy of the adjudicatory process, and therefore essential to
the functioning of the courts.83
His view is only a roadblock, however, for agreements that alter, in an
impermissible fashion, the rules that govern judicial resolution of disputes in state or
federal court. As Bone recognizes, the adjudicatory legitimacy he sees as essential to
these institutions is not a prerequisite to the proper functioning of alternative
mechanisms for resolving disputes (or overseeing compliance). It therefore does not
counsel against enforcement of a wide range of agreements about process, including

76. Solum, supra note 35, at 191 (arguing that “a right of participation can be justified for
reasons that are not reducible to either participation’s effect on accuracy or its effect on the
cost of adjudication”).
77. See id. at 274.
78. See id. at 303 (“[I]f rational persons are conceived as having an overriding interest in
having reasons to consider themselves as legitimately bound by erroneous decisions, then they
will choose participation over accuracy and cost.”).
79. Cf. id. at 266 (rejecting preference-satisfaction theory of value of participation
because it does not make participation an essential, irreducible aspect of adjudicatory process).
80. Id. at 303.
81. See Bone, supra note 6, at 1331.
82. Id. at 1336.
83. Id.
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agreements to arbitrate disputes rather than hear them in federal court, agreements
about the process that governs administrative procedures, and agreements to go without
process altogether.84 As a result, Bone’s theory applies (to the extent one finds it
persuasive) when it comes to deciding whether to allow parties to tailor the process
available to a dispute they agree to resolve in federal court, but is inapplicable outside
of that limited context. But participation surely has value outside of federal court.
d. Dodge’s Symmetrical Theory
Owen Fiss, in his article Against Settlement, did not specifically address the value
of process, but he did argue against allowing parties to resolve disputes on their own
terms to the extent that doing so could undermine the enforcement of substantive
laws written with full judicial enforcement in mind.85 Jaime Dodge’s “symmetrical
theory” can be understood as an intellectual heir of that view. Dodge argues that the
law should refuse to enforce agreements to alter procedures in state or federal court—
in other words, it should mandate process (within these domains)—where doing so
could undermine the enforcement goals of the substantive law at issue in the
dispute.86 David Noll has also offered a similar argument specific to agreements to
waive the option of bringing a dispute by class action.87
Like Bone’s “adjudicatory legitimacy,” Dodge’s symmetrical theory is not a
general theory of the value of participation. Instead, it is a theory of the value of
adjudication in federal or state court as sometimes viewed by legislators. Dodge’s
theory counsels in favor of mandatory process only where legislators actually
intend to use litigant-driven lawsuits as the means to enforce the legal right at issue,
and actually expect such litigation to proceed following the default rules set by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The proportion of suits that fall into this subset
is not clear.88
More importantly for present purposes, Dodge’s is not essentially an argument
about deference to parties’ choices about participatory process, it is an argument
about parties’ choices regarding whether (and how) to enforce their legal rights.
Therefore, participation is not an essential component of Dodge’s view. Dodge’s

84. Id. at 1354 (“[T]he distinctive feature of adjudication is its commitment to a particular
form of principled reasoning . . . this commitment is essential to its institutional legitimacy.”).
85. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that the legal
system in the United States is intended to further public values, not private interests of
disputants; disputants are means to an end).
86. See Dodge, supra note 6, at 730–31 (arguing that parties should be prohibited from
setting procedure by ex ante agreement that would limit or prevent enforcement of
nonwaivable constitutional, statutory, or procedural requirements). This view is closely related
to the compliance externality consequentialist justification for mandatory process, but takes as
its legitimizing force the goals of the substantive law rather than harms to third parties. It
therefore is included among the nonconsequentialist/deontological justifications for
mandatory process.
87. Noll, supra note 54.
88. See Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Courts Should Apply a Relatively More Stringent
Pleading Threshold to Class Actions, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1225, 1247 (2013) (explaining that
some statutes are not written with any expectation regarding lawsuit rate).
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view is that parties should not be allowed to agree by contract to enforcement
mechanisms that would produce less compliance than the default put into the law by
the legislature. As with the compliance externalities discussed above, this argument
supports mandating that parties’ choices about enforcement maintain at least as much
compliance as would the default (or, perhaps, prohibition of agreements that would
increase enforcement above that baseline)89 but do not support laws mandating that
parties employ adjudicatory process to obtain that end rather than other nonprocess
means, such as auditing.90
B. A Behavioral Approach to Mandatory Process
This subpart puts forward a behavioral conception of the value of participation
and points to research in behavioral economics indicating that people tend to
under-appreciate this value ex ante. The story of this subpart, shorn of details, is not
complicated. The story has three parts presented, in full, in sections 1, 2, and 3. Here
is the simple version:
First, bad things happen to us all the time. Almost always, we simply move on
with our lives. Either we do not even lament that things might have been better—
think of the last time you had the flu—or we momentarily grieve our loss but quickly
accept it, like a college-bound student forced to settle for his safety school.
Sometimes, though, our misfortunes possess us. We see a fault, we perceive an
unfairness, one that hurts us or our family, and we cannot look away. Our grievance
can drive us to sue, to gnash our teeth, to divorce, to depression, and to bitterness,
among other things. Grievances really hurt. That is the first part of the story,
subsection 1 (The Costs of Grievances).
Second, having a process available to resolve disputes can reduce grievances. It
can prevent us from experiencing a grievance, when we assume a bad outcome—
although bad—must be fair because we have the option to appeal it. And it can soothe
a grievance when just being heard heals, or at least softens, the hurt. That’s section
2: The Benefits of Process.
Third, we often do not realize that we could come to suffer a grievance and that
process could come to play an important role if we do, so we do not value procedural
protections enough ex ante. As a result, we might happily contract away our right to
sue, or sue in court, or sue quickly, when the possibility of a loss, let alone a
grievance, seems far off and farfetched. That’s section 3: Behavioral Economics and
the Market for Process.
And so the conclusion, and a new take on when to mandate process: when people
fail to predict how process might prevent or cure grievances, the law might help by

89. See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77–80 (2003)
(arguing that Congress creates private rights of action under the assumption that lawsuits will
be brought at the rate that autonomous individuals tend to sue).
90. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (discussing alternative means of
enforcement that could be better able to encourage compliance, under certain circumstances,
than claimant-driven adjudication); infra Part IV.C. (discussing possibility of ensuring
accuracy in administrative decision making without giving claimants any process rights).
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forcing them to buy process even though they think it is not worth it or by setting the
terms of such process to optimize its grievance-reducing power.
My goal here is not to demonstrate that behavioral market failure is the only
possible justification for mandatory process requirements. The contribution here is
to reconceive, and thereby improve upon, the classical economic approach that
scholars have applied when analyzing particular process mandates. This effort can
be understood as partially translating the concerns of proceduralists, like Mashaw,
into a more nuanced version of the model of the economists. Doing so brings the
economic and proceduralist approaches into greater alignment. It thereby shows that
mandatory process requirements can be justified under a broader range of conditions
than the economic approach would predict, but need not be as universal as the
proceduralist approach might indicate.
1. The Costs of Grievances
In order to assess the demand for dispute resolution process as opposed to other
means of enforcement, I focus on the feature of such process that distinguishes it
from other enforcement mechanisms—participation by the aggrieved.91 What sort of
cost—beyond fixing an error—does participation prevent or what sort of benefit does
it create? The sorts of losses that are ordinarily prevented by an enforcement
mechanism—monetary cost or physical injury—are poor candidates; participation is
not a necessary feature of an enforcement mechanism that addresses such losses.92
But harm is not always as straightforward as lost wages, or a broken car, or a
ruined lung. People can be remarkably resilient; research into happiness shows that
we are in some circumstances capable of rebounding from a debilitating loss of
wealth or function to be as happy as we were before.93 And research into dispute
formation shows that we sometimes barely notice that something bad has happened
to us, even when the law would, if we asked, provide us with hefty compensation.94

91. See supra Part I.
92. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
93. See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur,
Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013) (discussing research
into hedonic adaptation). But cf. Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy:
What’s the Use?, 62 DUKE L. J. 1509 (2013) (surveying normative hedonic literature and
questioning conclusions of Bronsteen et al.).
94. See PAUL C. WEILER, HOWARD H. HIATT, JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, WILLIAM G.
JOHNSON, TROYEN A. BRENNAN & LUCIAN L. LEAPE, A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 70 tbl.4.1 (1993) (showing
that about one in eight negligent injuries led to a legal claim); Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort
Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 448 (1987) (citing studies showing low lawsuit
rate); M.P. Baumgartner, Social Control in Suburbia, in 2 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
SOCIAL CONTROL 79, 82, 93 (Donald Black ed., 1984); Frederick C. Dunbar & Faten Sabry,
The Propensity to Sue: Why Do People Seek Legal Actions?, 42 BUS. ECON. 31 (2007); Robert
C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County,
38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 681–82 (1986); David M. Engel, The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders,
Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 551
(1984); Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to Sue in England and the United States of America:
Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L. SOC’Y 400 (1991); David M. Studdert, Eric J.
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Sometimes, however, losses stick. People perceive a loss as an injury, see it as
someone’s fault, feel wronged, and suffer. Often, they seek to right the wrong by filing a
lawsuit or appeal, if that route is available. Or they stew. This behavior, here called
grieving, has long been the focus of scholarly inquiry associated with the “name, blame,
claim” framework for analyzing the determinants of dispute formation: first, someone
identifies a harm, next, they blame someone else for it, and last, they file suit.95
Grievances pose significant welfare costs to those who suffer them. Qualitatively,
one might look to anecdotes of people whose lives were disrupted, often
permanently, by a grievance.96 Similarly, quantitative studies lend support to the
heavy cost of grievances.97 And research on the power of therapy focuses on the
importance of acceptance.98
Grievances can impose costs on others too. In the workplace, research shows that
employees who feel they have been mistreated are less likely to follow rules.99 And
in the private contractual context, research shows that parties that feel unfairly treated
will “shade,” that is, take unverifiable steps to reduce the value of performance to the
one they think wronged them.100
2. The Benefits of Process
Dispute resolution process differs from other mechanisms of enforcement by
reducing grievances in two ways. First, simply having the option of pursuing a dispute

Thomas, Helen R. Burstin, Brett I.W. Zbar, E. John Orav & Troyen A. Brennan., Negligent
Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250 (2000).
95. See Dan Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes,
15 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 655, 656 (1980), William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin
Sarat, The Emergency and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, and Claiming. . . ,
15 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 631 (1980-81); see also Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance
Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 302 (Cass Sunstein, ed. 2000) (qualitative study of parties to nuisance lawsuits
showed acrimony, perceived unfairness at play in decision to press claim through appeal,
declined to bargain after judgment).
96. E.g.; M. GREGGORY BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH (2011) (describing in detail one
woman’s fight to obtain insurance coverage); Joan Savitsky, A Patient Dies, and Then the
Anguish of Litigation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2009, at D5 (outlining anecdote of children of a
deceased patient, “whom I barely knew, were coping with their own complex emotions, which
I imagined to be grief, very likely anger and frustration, and perhaps misunderstanding. Filing
a malpractice suit somehow addressed this”).
97. E.g. Audrey Freshman, Financial Disaster as a Risk Factor for Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder: Internet Survey of Trauma in Victims of the Madoff Ponzi Scheme,73 HEALTH
& SOC. WORK 39 (2012) (reporting elevated levels of PTSD and other adverse behavioral
effects among victims of Bernie Madoff).
98. See generally ACCEPTANCE AND MINDFULNESS IN COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR THERAPY
(James D. Herbert & Evan M. Forman, eds., 2011).
99. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 187–91 (1988).
100. Yuval Feldman & T.R. Tyler, Mandated Justice: The Potential Promise and Possible
Pitfalls of Mandating Procedural Justice in the Workplace, 6 REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE
46, 53–63 (2012).
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resolution process could prevent a grievance from forming in the first place by making
the underlying decision appear fair—in behavioral terms, a framing effect.101 A person
might assume that a decision she has the right to challenge is fair where she would have
assumed the decision was unfair if the law left her no recourse.102
Second, and more directly, pursuing a process that is perceived to be fair can
itself soothe a person’s grievance, even if she does not prevail. When someone does
grieve, navigating a dispute resolution process that she perceives to be fair can ease
the dissatisfaction she feels with an outcome she initially viewed to be unfair, win
or lose.103 In other words, navigating a fair process can cure (or at least ease) a
grievance, regardless of outcome.104
This grievance-soothing benefit of participation is connected to empirical
research into procedural justice.105 This body of scholarship has investigated the

101. Research on medical malpractice claiming rates indicates that the likelihood of a
grievance there is a function of presentation and whether the doctor apologizes. See Kevin
Sack, Doctors Start to Say ‘I’m Sorry’ Before ‘I’ll See You in Court’, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2008, at A1. Furthermore, even alternative systems that allow a patient to feel heard reduce
claims. The literature on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, similarly, has shown myriad ways that
legal process can facilitate or hinder recovery from mental illness or have other therapeutic
effects. David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
125, 129 (2000). Cf. TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS,
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS AND GENDERED PARTIES 33–65 (2011); Mark A. Hall, Can You Trust
a Doctor You Can’t Sue?, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2005).
102. Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public
Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4, 12 (2007) (“Although many people never actually go to court,
believing that they could go to court if they needed to—and that, if they did, they would receive
consideration—is a key antecedent of trust and confidence in the legal system.” (citing TOM
R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH, YUEN J. HUO, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A
DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997).)).
103. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 2 (1988) (“What is striking about procedural justice judgments
is that they also shape the reactions of those who are on the losing side.”); Burke & Leben,
supra note 102, at 6 (“People are in fact more willing to accept a negative outcome in their
case if they feel that the decision was arrived at through a fair method.”); Tom R. Tyler, New
Approaches to Justice in the Light of Virtues and Problems of the Penal System, in SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT OF CRIME 19, 32 (Margit E. Oswald, Steffen Bieneck, Jorg
Hupfeld-Heinemann, eds., 2009); cf. Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for CourtConnected Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little,
23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549 (2007); Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’
Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal
Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63 (2008).
104. Cf. Arthur Pearlstein, Pursuit of Happiness and Resolution of Conflict: An Agenda for
the Future of ADR, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 215 (2012).
105. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 632 (1994) (“Although we consciously chose the individual legal
changes, we have not entirely comprehended their combined effect. As a consequence, we
sometimes debate particular features—for example, styles of judging, the virtues and vices of
discovery, abuses of the legal system, alternatives to litigation, and various docket-speeding
local experiments—without acknowledging their links to the system as a whole. We need a
better sense of these connections and a more comprehensive sense of how process functions
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components of process that affect whether participants come to view it as fair,
including voice and the behavior of the decision maker.106 These components may
be optional features of process that affect the degree to which it prevents and soothes
grievances.
Understanding the value of dispute resolution process as its capacity to soothe a
grievance reflects a core intuition about the usefulness of process that may be as old
as courts themselves. As Justice Frankfurter put it in 1951: “[n]o[] . . . better way
[has] been found for generating the feeling, so important to popular government, that
justice has been done.”107
And Justice Frankfurter himself was not a pioneer in recognizing the power of
participation to generate acceptance. In his seminal work Due Process in the
Administrative State, Jerry Mashaw offered support dating back to 2300 BC:
If you are a man who leads
Listen calmly to the speech of one who pleads;
Don’t stop him from purging his body
Of that which he planned to tell.
A man in distress wants to pour out his heart
More than that his case be won.
About him who stops a plea
One asks “Why does he reject it?”
Not all one pleads can be granted,
But a good hearing soothes the heart.108
The final line—“a good hearing soothes the heart”—bears emphasis, because it
highlights one additional consideration about the value of process. While a “good
hearing” has the power to generate acceptance and to soothe a hurt, a bad hearing—
a poorly designed process—can do the opposite. It can create bitterness rather than
take it away.109 That possibility increases the importance of questioning whether

as a system.”).
106. Burke & Leben, supra note 102, at 4 (“[1] voice, [2] neutrality, [3] respectful
treatment, and [4] engendering trust in authorities.”); Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski
& Nancy Spodic., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction With Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of
Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 72 (1985); see also E. Allan Lind,
Ruth Kanfer & Christopher P. Early, Voice, Control and Procedural Justice, 59 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990) (presenting study in which participants labeled
outcome as more fair when they had opportunity to speak, even after being told their opinion
would have no impact on outcome).
107. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
108. MASHAW, supra note 12, at vii (quoting PTTAHOTEP, supra note 12).
109. See David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel
B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 120 (1983). Some
studies in therapeutic jurisprudence have looked at the negative implications for the well-being
of participants of certain dispute resolution systems. See DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990) (various procedures for
determining fitness to stand trial may prevent recovery from mental illness); Janet Weinstein,
And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interest of Children and the Adversary System, 52
U. MIAMI L. REV. 79 (1999) (making case that adversary process heightens rather than soothes
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parties who have agreed to resolve disputes by a particular process (or no process)
have adequately taken into account the grievance-soothing power of process.
3. Behavioral Economics and the Market for Process
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have argued that the inherent value of
participating in a dispute resolution process, if any, can be modeled in economic
terms as the satisfaction of a “preference for fairness.”110 Formulating the value of
participation in this way leaves out three salient aspects of the costs of grievances
and benefits of process just set out.
First, the value of process comes not (or not only) from satisfaction of a preference
but from soothing of a hurt and elimination of a negative response.111 This aspect of
value should perhaps be modeled as the alteration, to the point of elimination, of a
preference. Such preference-shaping effects are entirely consistent with economic
analysis, although they do complicate matters by forcing relaxation of the static
preferences assumption.112
Second, the preference for fairness itself should not be viewed as constant but
instead as a (perhaps unpredictable) function of a loss that depends on whether the loss
is perceived to be unfair or not. The experience of a grievance (and accompanying
formation of a strong “preference for fairness”) is stochastic, so it is not certain one
way or the other at the time a person enters an agreement that she will suffer a grievance
should she come to suffer a loss. As a result, the grievance-reducing value of
participation is probabilistic; it depends on the possibility that a person will come to
suffer a grievance and so develop a strong taste for fairness as to a loss or that dispute
resolution process will be a soothing route for such a person.
Third, and relatedly, the decision about how much process should be available in
the event of a dispute necessarily takes place well before a loss (and, possibly, an
accompanying grievance) occurs. As a result, the experienced benefit of participation

dissatisfaction of child custody disputes).
110. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 36. But cf. Michael B. Dorff & Kimberly Kessler
Ferzan, Is There a Method to the Madness? Why Creative and Counterintuitive Proposals Are
Counterproductive, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW & ECONOMICS 21, 28 (Mark White
ed. 2009) (reviewing studies) (“[T]he mere lip service that is given to the taste for fairness
within the legal economist’s typical empirical conclusions is utterly unacceptable. The taste
for fairness is pervasive, and the preference for fairness is strong.”); Daniel Kahneman, Jack
L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS.
285 (1986).
111. See supra Parts II.B.1–2.
112. Cf. KAPLOW AND SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 415–18 (generally approving of
incorporating possibility of altered preferences into welfare economics, so long as change in
preferences does make people better off). See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions
as More than Prices: The Economic Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in
LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 153, 153 (Robin Paul Malloy
& Christopher K. Braun, eds. 1995) (“Law and economics scholars have identified various
areas in the law . . . in which legal prohibitions and penalties are not merely intended to act as
a price on the proscribed behavior, but are also intended to influence the underlying
preferences of the sanctioned parties and other members of society.”).
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in process is usually long delayed from the time that a decision is made about how
to value participation.
Each of these three salient features of the behavioral understanding of the value
of process—its potentially preference-altering effect, its probabilistic value, and its
delayed benefit—is a boundary condition for the presence of behavioral market
failure, depending on the decision-making of the buyer.
a. Projection Bias
As discussed above, the inherent value of process depends in various ways on
changed emotional states. Process is a framing device that may affect whether a
person suffers a grievance, and it is a preference-altering commodity insofar as it can
soothe grievances that do happen, even for those who do not ultimately prevail.
Furthermore, the latter benefit depends on the formation of a grievance, itself a shift
in a person’s emotional state.113
Preference endogeneity—the tendency of some legal regimes to change peoples’
preferences, rather than merely satisfy them—has been identified and studied in other
areas of the law. The most well-studied example of preference endogeneity in
behavioral economics may be the endowment effect: the finding that in certain
contexts the law’s assignment of an entitlement changes the way that entitlement is
valued by its recipient.114 Another, also well-developed area of research on dynamic
preferences is the study of the effect of law and legal institutions on the formation
and internalization of norms.115 The acceptance-generating function of process is an
additional way that the law may influence our preferences.

113. See supra, Part II.B.1.
114. For recent studies discussing the endowment effect, also known as referencedependent preferences, see, e.g., Andrea Isoni, Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, The
Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap, the ‘Endowment Effect,” Subject
Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations: Comment, 101 AM.
ECON. REV. 991 (2011); Owen D. Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A
New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935 (2008) (providing
evolutionary explanation for endowment effect); Jack L. Knetsch & Wei-Kang Wong, The
Endowment Effect and the Reference State: Evidence and Manipulations, 71 J. OF ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 407 (2009); Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Andreas Fuster, Expectations as
Endowments: Evidence on Reference-Dependent Preferences from Exchange and Valuation
Experiments, 126 Q. J. ECON. 1879 (2011). But see Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler,
Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and
Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2007) (questioning endowment effect).
115. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Evolution and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 490 (2006); Steffen Huck, Trust, Treason, and Trials: An Example of How
the Evolution of Preferences Can Be Driven by Legal Institutions, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 44
(1998). Cf. Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998)
(discussing wisdom of using law to influence norms). For an in-depth study focused on the
challenges of preference endogeneity to cost-benefit analysis, see Gregory Scott Crespi, The
Endogeneity Problem in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 96 (2010)
(conventional cost-benefit analyses “do not confront the difficulties involved in valuing
policies under those circumstances when one of their consequences is a significant alteration
of the preferences of a substantial number of people”).
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Research in behavioral economics provides reason to doubt that people
adequately account for future alterations in their emotional states when they make a
decision, suffering from a decision-making quirk Loewenstein dubbed “projection
bias.”116 Where present, projection bias “mean[s] that people wrongly project their
current emotional state onto their future selves.”117
A classic example of projection bias is the hungry shopper: a person who shops
while very hungry may over-estimate her desire for food when the time comes to eat
it because her hunger changes her preference for food and she fails to take that
alteration into account when making a purchase decision. Another example of
projection bias offered by Cass Sunstein is the decision to purchase a gym
membership; people mistakenly assume at the time they enter into a gym agreement,
usually just after the new year, that their current desire to work out will persist
throughout the year.118 As a result, people buy expensive long-term memberships
that they do not wind up using.
Projection bias has not received as much focus in the legal literature as other
behavioral phenomena like status quo bias or the endowment effect, but it has in
limited instances been the subject of scholarly attention in behavioral law and
economics.119 One reason for this may be that unlike other biases, it is not apparent
how projection bias can be “nudged” away.120 None of the nudges addresses

116. Loewenstein et al., supra note 16, at 1209 (“People exaggerate the degree to which
their future tastes will resemble their current tastes. We present evidence from a variety of
domains which demonstrates the prevalence of such projection bias.”); George Loewenstein
& Erik Angner, Predicting and Indulging Changing Preferences, in TIME AND DECISION 351
(Loewenstien et al., eds., 2003); cf. Daniel T. Gilbert, Elizabeth C. Pinel, Timothy D. Wilson,
Stephen J. Blumberg & Thalia P. Wheatley, Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1998).
117. Sunstein, Willingness, supra note 17, at 323.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 324 (pointing to projection bias as one reason for a gap between willingness
to pay and actual welfare). The primary exception is arguments about “cooling off” periods to
prevent people from making decisions while in temporary “hot” states. See id. These “cooling
off” periods function in much the same way as a process mandate: they prohibit decision
making until the shift in preferences has occurred. E.g. Jungmin Lee, The Impact of a
Mandatory Cooling-Off Period on Divorce, 56 J.L. & ECON. 227 (2013). Those arguments
apply only insofar as projection bias prevents a person in a temporary “hot” state from
projecting a future “cold” state; they do not address failures that result from more enduring
changes in preferences. An example of a projection-bias caused market failure resulting from
failure to appreciate a persistent alteration in preferences that might justify a mandate is
addiction. Laux has argued that addiction is a market failure resulting from failure of affective
forecasting. Fritz L. Laux, Addiction as a Market Failure: Using Rational Addiction Results
to Justify Tobacco Regulation, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 421 (2000). In this vein, John Strnad has
argued in favor of food tax based on the view that people do not anticipate the addictive effect
of many foods. John Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in
Developed Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221 (2005). Furthermore, Manuel Utset has argued
that failure to anticipate future hot states can lead to incomplete contracting. Manuel A. Utset,
A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The Case of Shareholder
Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329 (2003).
120. “[I]t is not clear how or whether public officials should react to the possibility of
projection bias.” Sunstein, Willingness, supra note 17, at 324. This is so, Sunstein says,
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projection bias as to a persistent change in emotional state that affects the value of a
contracted-for commodity. A default rule will not stick so long as one of the parties
to the contract has an incentive to “shift” the default, in which case that party will
be well positioned to do so.121 Forced choice is no solution, because those subject
to projection bias will make the wrong choice (for the reasons discussed above).
Finally, the research that we have indicates that disclosure does not effectively
counteract projection bias, perhaps because projection bias distorts a person’s
understanding of their own preferences, not their belief about a question of fact
(like optimism).122
Furthermore, because projection bias specifically interferes with the way people
value participation, it theoretically can justify a mandate that requires not only a
certain degree of oversight but also participation by the aggrieved in the oversight
mechanism. In short, the presence of projection bias can support not only a
compliance mandate, but mandatory process.
Theoretically, then, projection bias is a reason that parties contracting for dispute
resolution process before a dispute has arisen could tend to underestimate the
possibility that they might suffer a grievance and also underestimate the benefits of
access should they do so. In such conditions, it may be “efficient,” all else being
equal, to mandate such parties have process available should a dispute arise even if,
left to their own devices, they would not contract for it. (Of course, any such benefit
must be balanced against the “cost” of the mandate to parties who would not contract
for process even if they did not suffer from projection bias, including the liberty
“cost” of any mandate. That latter cost is reduced in the case of process mandates, as
explained in Part III.)
b. Optimism
The value of process depends not only on the formation of a grievance but also the
occurrence of a disappointing outcome. Those who are optimistic could tend to
underestimate the likelihood that things will not go as they hope, and so underestimate
the value of process (or any means of identifying and correcting errors).123

because “[t]he problem with projection bias is that it suggests that people will make choices
that do not promote their welfare, as when they end up with products that they do not enjoy
when they are using or consuming them.” Id. at 323–24. This is indeed a problem for soft
behavioral economics and for the freedom-of-contract rationale when applied to
preference-altering products or products whose value assumes static preferences. It is not a
problem for hard behavioral economics, but rather a policy challenge that a carefully
considered mandate can overcome. See infra Part III.
121. See Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 21 BERK. TECH. L.J. 62 (2014)
(discussing situations under which profit-interested parties with power to do so reverse
default rules).
122. See Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias, supra note 16, at 1238–39 (stating that it is
unlikely that learning could correct projection bias).
123. Sternlight and Jensen include a brief discussion of the possibility of optimism, as well
as risk-loving behavior, in the context of their analysis of the enforceability of class action
waivers. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 75, 96–99 (2004). Dodge includes a lengthy footnote that also makes these two
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Where optimism leads to failure in the market for process, the least
choice-restrictive option for remedying it is a disclosure rule, not a mandate. That is
the approach that has been taken to address failure resulting from optimism in other
markets, like the credit card market.124 To be sure, disclosure will not always work
as a solution to optimism, in which case a more intrusive regulatory response, such
as a mandate, may be warranted. Indeed, recent research into the actual effectiveness
of disclosure provides new reason to doubt its effectiveness in particular
applications.125
c. Hyperbolic Discounting
A final potential behavioral market failure that may also prevent some parties
from adequately accounting for the value of process at the time that they enter into a
contract is hyperbolic discounting. Hyperbolic discounting, also referred to as
“present bias,” is the occasional tendency demonstrated in various experimental
studies to prioritize short-term costs and benefits over costs and benefits that will not
accrue until later.126
To the extent that this tendency is indeed a bias, rather than a genuine preference,
it could prevent people from adequately assessing either the costs of grievances or
the benefits of dispute resolution process at the time they enter a contract, just as it
prevents efficient contracting in other contexts.127 However, the possibility that
hyperbolic discounting reflects true (if short-sighted) preferences rather than a bias128
makes it a problematic basis for a regulatory intervention.

suggestions. Dodge, supra note 6, at 759–60 n.139. Similarly, Baker and Lytton argue that
optimism could lead patients to under-estimate the likelihood of doctor error, and so
under-value their right to sue for malpractice. See Tom Baker & Timothy D. Lytton, Allowing
Patients to Waive the Right to Sue for Medical Malpractice: A Response to Thaler and
Sunstein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 233 (2010). For an argument noting that other-regarding
behavior could lead patients to waive their right to sue for malpractice even when they
otherwise would like to retain the right, and proposing a solution to that problem, see Matthew
J.B. Lawrence, Note, In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory
Agreement: Introducing Confidential Contracts as a Solution to the Doctor-Patient
Relationship Problem, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850 (2009).
124. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
126. See Richard H. McAdams, Present Bias and Criminal Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1607
(2011); Maribeth Coller, Glenn W. Harrison & E. Elisabet Rutström, Are Discount Rates
Constant? Reconciling Theory and Observation (Dec. 2003) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~harbaugh/Readings/Time/Are%20Discount%20
Rates%20Constant%20%20Reconciling%20Theory%20andObservation.pdf (showing that
discount rate is constant but there is a “present payment” premium).
127. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, No Contract? (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ.
& Org., Working Paper No. 13-06, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2220271.
128. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 1059 (“There is neither a theoretical nor an
empirical basis for the behaviorists’ implicit privileging of a future self.”).
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III. PROCESS REQUIREMENTS AS CHOICE-PRESERVING MANDATES
As discussed above, mandates are powerful medicine. The mere possibility of
behavioral market failure does not in itself warrant a nudge, let alone a mandate. That
is because the actual costs and benefits of a mandate can be difficult (some would
say impossible) to quantify, especially for policymakers (or academics!) that are, of
course, not themselves immune to behavioral bias.
This “knowledge problem,” as Mario Rizzo and Douglas Glen Whitman call it, is
not a mere roadblock for behavioral law and economics.129 Indeed it is no doubt a
large part of the reason behavioral law and economics has, thus far, focused on
recommending nudges, not mandates. Classical law and economics avoided the
difficulty of not fully understanding human decision making by using simplified
models to make recommendations with a certainty—at least within the assumptions
of the models. Most information problems are external to these models and so did
not directly undermine the recommendations, or at least did not until experimental
research began to show that some of the assumptions of classical economics can
deviate from actual human behavior in predictable ways.
The first wave of behavioral law and economics relaxed the classical economic
assumptions, allowing uncertainty into more realistic analyses, but made do
notwithstanding that uncertainty by limiting its policy recommendations to “nudges,”
such as policies (1) that feature negligible costs, as with a disclosure regime or (2)
that are directed to areas where a policy choice is inevitable, as with the choice of a
legal default.130 As such, this first wave was often able to make policy
recommendations comfortably based only on evidence about the decision making of
college students in stylized laboratory experiments, even in the face of substantial
uncertainty about just how beneficial or effective the recommended “nudge” would
be in the real world. And while some scholars were skeptical, policymakers were
not; agencies at the local, state, and federal level have implemented a number of
reforms advocated by the first wave of behavioral law and economics, sometimes
with demonstrable success.131
While the first wave of scholarship in behavioral economics largely circumvented
the knowledge problem by pushing for interventions that ultimately preserve
freedom of choice, such as disclosure requirements and default rules, not all
behavioral market failures can be solved with nudges. As Bubb and Pildes rightly
point out in their forthcoming article, by focusing on nudges scholars have ignored
behavioral market failures that may be correctible only by a mandatory
intervention.132

129. Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New
Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905 (2009). Jennifer Arlen may have been the first to note
this problem for behavioral economics in an early comment. Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The
Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAN. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (1998) (“It is
difficult to predict how, when, or whether many of these biases will manifest themselves in
the real world.”).
130. See supra notes 120–122 and accompanying text (discussing these and other nudges).
131. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013).
132. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 21, at 1595 (“Put simply, it would be surprising if the main
policy implications of substantial evidence documenting the failure of individual choice were
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Hard behavioral economics of the variety Bubb and Pildes advocate does not have
the luxury of either the internal certainty of classical law and economics or the de
minimis costs of the regulations advocated by the first wave of behavioral law and
economics. But process mandates have their own distinctive features that make them
easier to justify.
Process mandates are not purely liberty-restricting, in fact they ensure freedom of
choice (ex post) at the same time that they take away freedom of choice (ex ante).
This fact lowers the justificatory threshold necessary to support a process mandate
and may help to explain their pervasive presence. (It is also a reason that other
choice-preserving mandates—including no-fault divorce rules and prohibitions on
liquidated damages that make it easier for a contracting party to breach—are not as
normatively problematic as ordinary mandates.)
To be sure, because the choice that a process mandate preserves is downstream
from the choice that it forbids, process mandates (and other choice-preserving
mandates) still run contrary to the assumption that parties are best positioned to know
what will satisfy their own preferences, and so the presumption that any mandate will
prevent efficiency-creating bargains. But that is the very rationality presumption that
much of behavioral economic research occasionally undermines.133 As such, an
analysis supporting (or attacking) a process mandate in a particular case, like any
good behavioral analysis, must (1) be precise about the behavioral phenomenon at
issue because not all departures from classical rationality actually cause market
failure, (2) be attentive to contextual boundary conditions, (3) consider the baseline
in deciding whether to recommend regulation, and (4) consider the possibility that
learning might cure any behavioral market failure without intervention.134 These

a turn toward regulatory instruments that preserve individual choice.”); id. at 1601 (“We come
not to bury [behavioral law and economics], but to push it even further.”).
133. See generally id.
134. See Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L.
REV. 237 (2008); Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEX. L. REV. 573
(2014). On the possibility of learning that cures biases, see Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein,
Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006) (discussing learning and use of law to
change biases). If people’s preferences vary predictably, then in theory people should have as
much ability to learn that fact as policymakers. Indeed, individuals should have particularized
insight into their own susceptibility to this effect, something policymakers can never achieve.
Thus, it is only the possibility of projection bias that makes preference endogeneity a basis for
regulation. For example, the thriving market for negative preference-altering products
(addictive drugs) suggests they are something we should think carefully about regulating. Cf.
Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J.
ECON. 1261, 1285–86 (2001) (self-control model); Jonathan Gruber and Botond Koszegi, A
Theory of Government Regulation of Addictive Bads: Optimal Tax Levels and Tax Incidence
for Cigarette Excise Taxation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8777, Feb.
2002) (presenting time-inconsistent preferences as justification for regulation of addictive
drugs). On the other hand, there is no consensus that addiction indicates a departure from
rationality, rather debate about the consistency of Becker’s rational addiction model with
actual behavior still persists. See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational
Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675, 694–95 (1988); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs
of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex-Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
1163, 1181–1223 (1998); see also W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION
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contextual considerations are a reason that this Article does not purport to say that
mandatory process requirements are always justified (or never are). The behavioral
approach provides an explanation for the prevalence of process mandates in our law
as well as a framework for deciding when process should be mandatory, but
assessment of the desirability of a particular process mandate requires consideration
of context, as shown in the examples provided in the next Part.
But choice-respecting mandates do largely avoid a second objection to mandates
often offered in support of a presumption against regulation, that is, the liberty cost
of any mandate. To lovers of liberty, any mandatory rule comes with an inherent
liberty cost because it deprives people of the right to make a choice, even a bad
choice. Critics of behavioral law and economics have attacked behavioral studies for
failing to consider this liberty cost, which they urge should create a presumption
against regulatory intervention.135
The liberty cost of mandates is a critical component in the debate about the
normative desirability of whether and how to interfere in individual decision making
(by nudge, by mandate, or not at all). The idea that nudges preserve choice (by, for
example, leaving a regulated party the opportunity to opt out of a default rule) was
the key move that broke open the first wave of soft normative behavioral economic
analysis, associated with “libertarian paternalism” and “asymmetric paternalism.”136
Additionally, the liberty cost of mandates and nudges is a load-bearing aspect of
the argument of those who say that because of the knowledge problem, policymakers
should not employ behavioral market failure as a justification for regulation.137 That
is because the knowledge problem does not actually counsel for or against regulation,
it says only that it is difficult for policymakers to know the true effect of regulation.
In order to use this insight as an argument against regulation, proponents rely on a
presumption against restricting choice on the ground that come what may, laws that
interfere with choice pose liberty costs.138 This approach makes sense; if we are
uncertain about most costs and benefits of an intervention, but certain of one cost, it
follows naturally that we should err against the intervention.
This is why it is important that process mandates and other choice-respecting
mandates do not pose as great a liberty cost as ordinary mandates. While a process
mandate deprives both parties of a choice ex ante, namely, the choice to waive (or
otherwise specify) process, it does so while giving one of the affected parties a choice
she would not otherwise have had ex post, namely, the right to air her grievance. As
such, a process mandate is not as purely liberty restricting as, for example, a ban on
cigarette smoking or mandate that people save for retirement. Indeed, a process
mandate may seem more liberty enhancing than the alternative to a customer or
patient or employee who is reminded at the time of suit, after suffering a grievance,
that she has agreed in advance with the seller or insurer or employer that she has
grown to loathe that she would not sue, or could sue only in the forum and through
the process designed by her opponent. (The seller or insurer or employer, of course,
will take the opposite view).

(1992); ROBERT D. TOLLISON & RICHARD E. WAGNER, THE ECONOMICS OF SMOKING (1992).
135. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 42.
136. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 21, at 1604.
137. E.g. Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 129.
138. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 1062–67.

1460

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1429

Furthermore, the normative case for already-extant process mandates is even
stronger. Process mandates already pervade the law and often become the subject of
controversy only when scholars employing the classical economic approach
advocate they be rescinded.139 Against a baseline of mandatory process, which may
itself be adaptive, the mere possibility of behavioral market failure cuts against the
certainty of arguments that employ the rationality assumptions of classical economic
analysis.140
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The behavioral approach to mandatory process should be taken into account
anytime policymakers decide whether to mandate process, eliminate an existing
mandate, or decide how much process to mandate. This Part demonstrates the
operation of the behavioral approach as to four specific process policy questions.
Subpart A discusses how the behavioral approach can be used to defend the ACA’s
process mandate. Subpart B discusses implications for agreements to alter the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, currently the subject of active scholarly debate.
Subpart C offers implications for an open question of constitutional law, specifically,
the question whether claimants to government benefits may waive their right to
process “due” under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States. Subpart D shows how the explanation offered here can point out not
just where a process mandate is justified, but where one is not.
A. Explaining the Affordable Care Act’s Process Mandate
The Obama Administration has famously embraced the “asymmetrically
paternalistic” approach to regulation advocated by Cass Sunstein, Christine Jolls, and
others, enacting numerous regulations that only “nudge” people to behave in a
particular way while leaving the ultimate choice to them. But the Administration’s
signature legislative enactment, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
famously takes a different approach. The ACA does not nudge, it shoves.
The ACA’s most famous mandates, so far, are the requirement that uninsured
individuals obtain health insurance, the “individual mandate”; the requirement that
all insurance plans include coverage for contraceptive services, the “contraception

139. Consider, for example, the controversy surrounding Richard Epstein’s suggestion that
parties be allowed to contract out of the malpractice system. See Richard A. Epstein, Medical
Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87 (1976); see also Lawrence,
supra note 123, at 851 (“Scholars of law and economics have long contemplated versions of
[Epstein’s] proposal, although currently there is no uniform endorsement of the idea.” (internal
citations omitted)).
140. This insight is a specific application of the more general point that it is easier to use
behavioral economics to support “anti-antipaternalism”—here, to doubt the freedom-of-contract
rationale as a basis for restricting extant process mandates—than it is to use behavioral economics
to support outright paternalism. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541 (1998) (“[B]ounded
rationality pushes toward a sort of anti-antipaternalism—a skepticism about antipaternalism, but
not an affirmative defense of paternalism.”).
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mandate”; and the requirement that employers provide subsidized health insurance
to their full-time employees, the “employer mandate.” The bases for and wisdom of
these mandates has been the subject of extensive popular and scholarly attention.
The health reform law contains a fourth mandate that has not received the same
level of attention, yet. The law mandates the procedural rights that must be made
available as part of health insurance coverage decision making.
“One of the most important consumer protections” in a law that doubles down on
insurer-administered healthcare, this process mandate says that even purely private
health insurers must offer their beneficiaries the opportunity to challenge decisions
denying healthcare coverage claims all the way to an “independent” external
reviewer.141 The reform is a significant one. In 2013 alone, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services expected more people to air their grievances through this
dispute resolution process than to file civil lawsuits of any kind in federal court.142
And this process mandate is likely to grow in importance as the need to curb growing
healthcare costs presses insurers to ration coverage more explicitly.143
Why mandate a process to govern review of health plan coverage decisions rather
than leave such choices to freedom of contract? The forgoing analysis presents an
explanation. At the time a beneficiary shops for insurance, the possibility of needing
coverage for a particular treatment of service is far off; the possibility of such needed
coverage being denied will seem more remote still. Furthermore, if projection bias
causes the beneficiary to assume static emotional states, then she will not anticipate
that a denial of coverage could cause her particular emotional harm (separate from
the financial loss), and so will not anticipate that participating in a dispute resolution
process could soothe such a grievance. And beyond projection bias, a beneficiary

141. Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: The Appeals Process Amended Rule,
HEALTH AFFAIRS (June 23, 2011), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/06/23/implementing-health
-reform-the-appeals-process-amended-rule/; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
142. Compare Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43328, 43343 tbl.2 (July 23, 2010)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (projecting 377,500 appeals will be sought in 2013), with
Filings in the Federal Judiciary Continued to Grow in Fiscal Year 2010, THE THIRD BRANCH
(Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 15, 2011, at 3 available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-0301/Filings_in_the_Federal_Judiciary
-Continued_to_Grow_in_Fiscal_Year_2010.aspx (noting two percent annual growth rate in
civil filing numbers, with a total of 282,895 filed in 2010).
143. See M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH 10 (2011) (“Medicine’s therapeutic
potential is surpassing our ability to pay for it. . . . We will ration care.”); see also ROBERT P.
RHODES, HEALTH CARE POLITICS, POLICY, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: THE IRONIC TRIUMPH
14 (1992) (“No more can we explain death and suffering as a consequence of fate. It is our
medicine, or lack of it, that denies death and suffering. We know we must choose who receives
scarce resources and who does not. No longer can we attribute to fate or to God the
responsibility for making life-and-death decisions. . . . These new choices challenge our basic
values and frequently produce conflict.”); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Charles C. Griffin, & Caitlin
E. Carroll, U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical Development and Choices for
the 1990s, 21 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 150 (1993) (“Medical ‘need’ was once thought to set
a natural limit on services; in fact, ‘need’ is an expansive, not a limiting concept.”).
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might be optimistic about the likelihood of being denied coverage, which would also
cause her to underappreciate the value of an appeal right.
To be sure, this is all supposition; we do not have data on either the benefit a
claimant gets from challenging an insurance coverage denial or of beneficiaries’
actual susceptibility to projection bias. Here is where the “knowledge problem”
usually proves fatal for mandates144; where we are unsure about the presence of a
behavioral market failure, the fact that mandates limit choice counsels against their
adoption. But as discussed in Part III, that argument does not have the same force in
this context.
The prevalence of process mandates throughout the law and the fact that a process
mandate actually promotes choice for the beneficiary ex post (by giving her the option
to appeal) even while limiting her options ex ante (by taking away her option to forego
a right to appeal) undercuts the force of the freedom-of-contract presumption. If one
views the former choice (the option to appeal) to be as meaningful as the latter (the
option to waive the right to appeal), it is not clear which way the intrinsic value of
liberty cuts, making the ACA’s choice to mandate process for plan beneficiaries
defensible in light of the mere possibility of projection bias. Indeed, the anguished
reaction of patients and courts to the former (no process) state of affairs indicates that
the option to appeal is indeed an especially significant choice.145
B. Contracting Around the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In the past several years, a vibrant literature has explored whether and when
federal courts should permit parties to alter, by agreement, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.146 The ultimate approach that courts take to answer this question could
have substantial implications for the administration of civil justice in the United
States. Excellent surveys of the growing importance of this practice and the scholarly
debate surrounding it are put forward by Davis and Hershkoff, Bone, and Dodge.147
The behavioral approach to mandatory process offered above has significant
implications for this issue.
First, the possibility that projection bias could lead parties to undervalue their day
in court provides an independent reason to be concerned about agreements to alter
procedural rules that affect the perceived fairness of civil process. At the same time,
it provides reason to be sanguine about rules that force participation in programs
intended to do nothing more than air (and thereby soothe) grievances, such as

144. See supra Part III.
145. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
146. E.g., Robert G. Bone, supra note 6, at 1333 n.21, 1334 nn.22–23(collecting sources
pro and con contracts to alter the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); id. at 1342–52 (discussing
current law on enforcement of agreements to alter rules of procedure in federal and state court);
Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 527; Dodge, supra note 6, at 734–38 (discussing
enforcement of procedural contracts in federal court); Resnik, supra note 6, at 613; Taylor
& Cliffe, supra note 60, at 1098–1105 (arguing that Rules Enabling Act prohibits judicial
enforcement of contractual alterations to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
147. See Bone, supra note 6; Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6; Dodge, supra note 6.
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requirements that parties participate in mediation before hearing their dispute in court,
even if the parties do not think in advance that mediation will be worth the effort.148
Contracts altering rules of civil procedure that affect the grievance-soothing
functions of process—the “day in court”—are especially suspect due to the
possibility of behavioral market failure preventing one or both parties from
adequately assessing this value ex ante. This concern augments the classical
economic concerns discussed in Part II.A.1, as well as the federal court-specific
concerns discussed in Parts II.A.2(c) and (d), providing a reason to refuse
enforcement even when those concerns are absent and bolstering the case against
enforcement when they are present.
Research into procedural justice indicates particular rules that should be
especially resistant to contractual alteration. The first are those rules that affect access
to an in-person hearing, because of the importance of that right to the
acceptance-generating power of process.149 This obviously implicates procedural
changes that take away this right directly, like an agreement waiving the right to trial
by jury, or an agreement to appear by telephone. It also implicates agreements that
make an in-person hearing practically more difficult, such as forum selection clauses
that force a plaintiff to litigate in a distant forum.
Another category of rules of civil procedure that the behavioral approach indicates
should be especially resistant to contractual alteration are those that affect the quality
of cases a plaintiff may bring. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
governs pleading, is the most apparent example of such a rule.150 Agreements
altering the filing fee schedule are also suspect under the behavioral approach, as are
agreements limiting the availability of discovery during the pendency of a motion to
dismiss (perhaps by providing for an automatic stay).151 (Such an agreement limits
access insofar as discovery during the pendency of the motion could, due to the
possibility of amendment, make the pleading threshold easier to meet.) While
efficiency may dictate that losing cases be weeded out, the behavioral approach
indicates that there is value even to giving a losing plaintiff his day in court and that
plaintiffs will tend to underestimate that value before a dispute arises.
Second, as a general matter, the behavioral approach counsels in favor of an
across-the-board prohibition on all agreements to alter rules that implicate the
grievance-soothing functions of process.152 By adding an additional
context-dependent reason to doubt, in a particular case, that parties’ contracts to alter
such Federal Rules are in fact in the parties’ interest, the behavioral approach
ultimately counsels in favor of a uniform rule against enforcement. Coupled with
other context-dependent inquiries, such as the inquiry into whether enforcement of

148. See Ettie Ward, Mandatory Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United
States Federal Courts: Panacea or Pandemic?, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 77, 78–79 (2007).
149. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 557 (2007)
(interpreting pleading standard of Rule 8 to weed out implausible suits).
151. See generally Kevin J. Lynch, When Staying Discovery Stays Justice: Analyzing Motions
to Stay Discovery When a Motion to Dismiss is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (2012) (in
many districts discovery automatically proceeds during pendency of motion to dismiss).
152. To the extent possible, such a blanket prohibition might include a carveout for suits
between two corporate entities. See infra Part IV.D.1.
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the contract would undermine the underlying substantive law envisioned by Dodge,
and the inquiry into whether enforcement would undermine other purposes of the
federal courts envisioned by Davis and Hershkoff, the “cost” of adjudicating whether
to enforce particular procedural contracts could easily outweigh any benefit that a
case-by-case approach would have over a uniform prohibition.153 That is, the more
that must be considered in order to apply a standard, the more attractive a rule begins
to look. This concern is heightened in designing a set of adjudicatory procedures
whose very purpose is uniformity.154
In sum, the behavioral approach has important implications for civil procedure. It
counsels against enforcement of predispute agreements altering rules that limit a
claimant’s right to an actual hearing, such as forum selection clauses, as well as
agreements that limit a claimant’s right to come to court in the first place, provided
in the pleading standard of Federal Rule 8 and elsewhere.
C. Due Process: Nudge or Mandate?
The most famous process mandate in American law is surely the Fifth
Amendment’s instruction that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”155 But even due process is not always
mandatory process. In some circumstances, the Supreme Court has treated the Due
Process Clause as a mere nudge, a default rule subject to opt out. In others, the Court
has not yet decided whether the clause mandates or nudges due process. In such cases
the behavioral approach is illuminating.
To crystallize the discussion, a hypothetical: Mashaw’s prominent study of the
administration of social security disability suggests that much of the energy spent on
administrative appeals could be better spent on getting initial decisions right.156
Assuming policymakers agreed in a particular case, could they offer participants the
choice of opting out of the default, due-process-required administrative appeal
system ex ante, and into a system in which the resources that would have been spent
on due process are poured into getting decisions right in the first instance? Or even
a system in which the resources saved by not operating the administrative appeals
mechanism are poured into extra benefits for those who opt out? Given the massive
transaction costs of operating entitlement appeals systems in social security,
Medicare, veterans’ benefits, and elsewhere, this hypothetical is not so farfetched.
The constitutionality of a predispute opt-out administrative process regime
governing such a “new property” entitlement157 subject to due process protections
would implicate two potentially conflicting lines of Supreme Court precedent. In a
series of cases beginning with M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Supreme

153. See generally Lawrence, supra note 88 (discussing choice between rule and standard
in designing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); cf. Bone, supra note 6 (expressing doubt that
costs and benefits of procedural contracts can be measured and weighed).
154. Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 60, at 1100–04. But see Bone, supra note 6, at 1371
(rejecting uniformity argument against contractual deviations from the Federal Rules).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
156. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1985); see also ELEANOR D. KINNEY,
PROTECTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS (2002) (building on Mashaw’s analysis).
157. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
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Court held that the due process protections offered to litigants prior to entry of a civil
judgment may be waived ex ante, before a dispute has arisen.158 Indeed, in Overmyer
Co. Inc. v. Frick Co., the Court found due process was not violated by a cognovits
note, by which a debtor agreed in advance that her creditors’ attorney could agree to
a civil judgment on her behalf.159 This is why an arbitration need not follow all the
procedures that due process requires be available in federal court in order to produce
an enforceable judgment against the defendant.
On the other hand, in addressing specifically the procedural protections that must
be available when the government alters or withdraws an entitlement, the Supreme
Court has rejected the theory that claimants can be asked to accept the “bitter with
the sweet,” that is, that subconstitutional procedures are permissible when they are
provided for in the law that creates the initial entitlement. As the Court put it in
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill: “The right to due process is conferred, not by
legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not
to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally
authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate
procedural safeguards.”160
An opt-out regime conditioning access to a better administrative process or to
enhanced benefits would not conflict with this precise holding, because the alteration
to the constitutionally created safeguards would come by contractual agreement, not
legislative mandate. But it would conflict with the spirit of Loudermill insofar as the
reasoning that the content of “due process” is to be determined by the Court in
interpreting the Constitution precludes contractual as well as legislative alteration.
How should this question of law be resolved? Lower courts that have addressed
predispute agreements to go without the protections of due process have held them
to be enforceable on freedom-of-contract grounds.161 Furthermore, scholars have
suggested that an opt-out administrative regime should be constitutionally
permissible, again seeing “no obvious injustice or arbitrariness in holding the
individual bound by the procedural strings that were voluntarily accepted.”162 The

158. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
159. 405 U.S. 174, 187–88 (1972) (holding the cognovits note was enforceable). The Court
did reserve the question whether cognovits notes would be enforceable in other situations. Id.
at 188 (“Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other facts of other cases. For
example, where the contract is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining
power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal
consequences may ensue.”); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94–96 (1972) (holding
that the waiver was facially invalid in adhesive consumer contract).
160. 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
161. See Gorham v. City of Kansas City, 590 P.2d 1051, 1058 (Kan. 1979) (holding that
union could waive due process rights through collective bargaining agreement so long as
replacement procedures were “fair, reasonable, and efficacious”); Antinore v. State, 371
N.Y.S.2d 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 921 (1976) (enforcing collective
bargaining agreement that limited due process rights). Cf. Murphy v. Wack, No. 89 Civ. 3300,
1991 WL 64193, at *5 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1991) (wondering whether Antinore is still good
law after Loudermill).
162. Rodney M. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69, 111 (1982)
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behavioral approach shows that the case for allowing opt-out of due process prior to
the formation of a dispute is not so straightforward.
Whether an agreement to opt-out of procedural due process protections before a
dispute has arisen should be constitutional is a different question than the one the
behavioral approach addresses, that is, whether the law should approve of such an
agreement simply as a matter of policy on the basis of the freedom-of-contract
assumption that doing so would be welfare enhancing. In particular, the
constitutional question might implicate questions about original intent (if you are an
originalist); about the interpretation of precedent (we are all precedentialists); and
about the design of constitutional rules (which are difficult to tailor case by case).
However, the scholars and courts that have approved of the constitutionality of
such agreements have focused only on the freedom-of-contract rationale as a reason
to do so. Here, the behavioral approach offers a rebuttal. Even an agreement made
knowingly, without any imbalance in bargaining power, may reflect the behavioral
biases discussed in Part II.B—projection bias and also optimism or hyperbolic
discounting—that could lead the would-be claimant to undervalue her right to
process. While Laurence Tribe asked “why should a would-be government employee
. . . not be permitted to waive procedural protections” ex ante,163 these behavioral
considerations provide an answer: because she may undervalue her right to a “day in
court” when entering into such an agreement. In light of the constitutional gravity of
the issue, such ex ante waivers should not be enforced absent assurance that the
claimant was not subject to projection bias. (In the case of a corporate claimant this
may not be difficult to acquire, see infra Part IV.D, but in the case of an ordinary,
mortal applicant for benefits it may be far more difficult.)

(“[W]hen the contractual relationship between the state and the individual is free of such
coercive taint, there is no obvious injustice or arbitrariness in holding the individual bound by
the procedural strings that were voluntarily accepted. Some rights may be inalienable in some
situations, just as some bargains are illegal despite mutual and uncoerced assent; but as long
as courts retain their normal power to police bargains and carefully scrutinize the contractual
process, the lack of meaningful procedural recourse for an individual can surely be the
legitimate object of an enforceable bargain.”) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 114 (“If
the validity of the condition turns on balancing the government interest against the individual
right involved, there is nothing wrong with ‘devaluing’ the individual interest when it is
voluntarily bartered for a benefit.”); id. (“[T]o the extent that concerns for individual dignity
create a need for due process norms as ends in themselves, those dignity interests are
legitimately devalued when abrupt procedure is voluntarily accepted.”); Laurence H. Tribe,
Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 280 n.37 (1975) (“Absent some
notion of great bargaining inequality, why should a would-be government employee, or a
would-be debtor, not be permitted to waive procedural protections in return for benefits each
would rather enjoy in hybrid form than not at all?”) (emphasis in original); W. Bradley
Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 305, 374 (2001) (“[T]he
recipient of a government benefit may be deemed to have waived due process rights as part of
the bargaining process by which the benefit was obtained.”).
163. Tribe, supra note 162, at 280 n.37 (emphasis omitted).
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D. Mandate Unjustified: Insurers’ Contracts with Medicare
The behavioral approach is especially essential to informed analysis of process
policy in areas where policymakers are tasked with deciding whether the law should
mandate process where it previously did not do so. That is, because unlike reliance
on a single deontological view or potential externality, the behavioral approach is
capable of doing more than just defending existing process mandates; when neither
projection bias nor any of the justifications discussed in Part II.A are present, the
behavioral approach counsels against a process mandate. Such questions are
especially common and important in the increasingly regulated tenth of the economy
related to healthcare, as illustrated in Part IV.A, and this Section points to another
such application: private insurers’ contracts with the federal government to
administer Medicare or operate on the Affordable Care Act’s exchanges.
The United States government is very much in the business of healthcare
coverage. The ACA amplified that role.164 Rather than displace the market for
healthcare with a single-payer system, the ACA expanded that market—mandating
demand—while simultaneously increasing the surveillance role of government in the
marketplace.165 In an effort to tame healthcare, an industry that is perceived to be
unique, the invisible hand of the market has been partnered with the red, white, and
blue one of Uncle Sam.
This public-private partnership is evident even in the design of original Medicare,
the first-enacted federally subsidized insurance program for the elderly and
disabled.166 Medicare Parts A and B—original Medicare—are nominally “single
payer,” in the sense that the government directly pays for medical services provided
to beneficiaries.167 They are actually operated, however, by third-party contractors,
often working for a profit, who are hired by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services to run Medicare on its behalf.168 And, of course, providers and device
manufacturers do not work for the government; they remain in the private sector and
agree to serve Medicare beneficiaries only because they are paid to do so.169
The private role in public healthcare is even more pronounced in the more recent
additions to government-subsidized healthcare, Medicare Parts C and D.170 There,

164. See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1611 (2011) (discussing
minimum coverage requirements and other ACA initiatives to regulate private insurance).
165. Id.
166. See Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked,
101 GEO. L.J. 519 (2013).
167. Id. at 530.
168. Id. at 527.
169. See id.
170. In Medicare Part C, Medicare beneficiaries opt to put their Medicare premium dollars
toward privately-administered health insurance, rather than participate in the federally run
Medicare program. Insurers who accept Medicare Part C beneficiaries enter into agreements
with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services that govern the terms of their plans, but
benefit not only by having access to a wider customer base, but also by receiving risk sharing
and other subsidies from the taxpayers.
In Medicare Part D—the Medicare prescription drug program—Medicare formally
contracts with insurers, known as “Part D sponsors,” to provide coverage to Medicare
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the government is not actually the payer, from the perspective of either the
beneficiary or the provider. Instead, private nonprofit and for-profit insurers provide
coverage to beneficiaries in these components, with the government subsidizing and
regulating that coverage on the back end through contractual and quasi-contractual
agreements with the participating insurers.171
The public-private partnership continues in the ACA. Under the Act, the
government increased demand for coverage in the individual market by mandating
individuals buy health insurance that covers certain benefits. At the same time, the
Act tasks state and federal governments with creating and administering an exchange
marketplace in which such plans are bought and sold, and entitles participating
insurers to government-subsidized (i.e., taxpayer-subsidized) and administered risk
protection through the risk corridors and cost sharing.172 As in Medicare, the insurers
that choose to participate in the government-run marketplace created by the ACA get
the benefit of increased revenues resulting from government subsidies, but must be
willing to subject themselves to heightened government control.173 So far, some
insurers have thought that tradeoff worth it, while others have not.174
Disputes between the government and such insurers that choose to do business
with it in the medical marketplace are inevitable. One common sort of dispute arises
out of the myriad payment determinations that the government must make—in
Medicare Parts A, B, C, and D—as well as in operating on the ACA’s exchanges. In
each area, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the responsible
division of the Department of Health and Human Services, must calculate the
payments owed to particular providers, insurers, and hospitals.175 (The CMS will first
do this as to participants in the ACA’s exchanges in early 2015, after the 2014 plan
year is concluded.) This amounts to millions of individualized calculations each year;
forming the fodder for as many disputes as there are contracting insurers and providers.
In many of these areas, the legal right to ex post dispute resolution process
afforded to entities that do business with the government remains undetermined. In
the areas where this question has been resolved, however, the law has generally
mandated that the private nonprofit and for-profit entities that do business with the
government have available the same process for resolving disputes with the
government—including case by case adjudication in federal court—that is made
available to Medicare beneficiaries, or to citizens aggrieved by agency action

beneficiaries at great reduced cost. The Part D contracts these sponsors enter into with the
HHS set the premiums they will charge, the reimbursement they will receive from the
government, the distribution of risk between the insurer and the government, and so on.
171. See Bagley, supra note 166, at 527.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 18061 (2012) (Transitional reinsurance); 42 U.S.C. § 18062 (2012)
(Risk corridors calendar years 2014, 2015, 2016); 42 U.S.C. § 18063 (2012) (Risk adjustment).
173. See Baker, supra note 164, at 1611–12 (discussing exchange participation).
174. See Leemore Dafny, Jonathan Gruber & Christopher Ody, More Insurers Lower
Premiums: Evidences from Initial Pricing in the Health Insurance Marketplaces (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ Research, Working Paper No. 20140, 2014), available at http://www.nber.org
/papers/w20140.
175. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Amendments to the HHS Notice of
Benefit and Payment Parameters 2014, 78 Fed. Reg. 15,541, 15,543 (Mar. 11, 2014) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 153, 156) (describing method for calculating subsidies).
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generally.176 This is so notwithstanding the possibility that these entities might freely
enter business with the government even if no such process were available. This can
be because of either statutory or regulatory requirements, and sometimes is the
product of the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action applied
by courts.177 Indeed, in some cases insurers are entitled to more dispute resolution
process than is offered to individual beneficiaries.178
The law mandates dispute resolution in this domain reflexively, assuming that
entities that voluntarily do business with the government to administer healthcare
should have access to the same dispute resolution process that statutes and
regulations currently make mandatory for Medicare beneficiaries or other individuals
aggrieved by nonconsensual agency action. But the behavioral approach shows that
this assumption is unfounded.
Unlike beneficiaries, insurance companies are rational actors with one static
preference, namely, wealth maximization. As such, dispute resolution process serves
a diminished grievance-reducing function vis-a-vis insurers that contract with the
government to administer Medicare benefits, as explained in Part I. As to such firms,
mandatory dispute resolution process can be justified only by either its
error-reducing functions or a deontological preference for a system in which process
is available in such situations. Both justifications are unpersuasive in this context, as
explained in Parts II and III.
1. Corporate Grievances?
Insurance companies are rational wealth maximizers. There is no reason to believe
that insurers suffer the costs of grievances discussed above, and so no reason to
believe dispute resolution serves a grievance-reducing function vis-a-vis these
entities. Insurers do not grieve. True, insurers’ employees may grieve, and may even
benefit personally when the firm has its day in court. But the shareholders of
publically traded corporations, at least, would presumably not want such employee
grudges to influence the insurer’s behavior.
2. Error Reduction and Medicare Payment Appeals
While grievance reduction is a function that dispute resolution process is uniquely
capable of providing, error reduction is not. In many contexts, including the
calculation of payments to insurers, the goal of error reduction can be more
efficiently obtained by other means, such as greater investment in accuracy ex ante
or auditing and random sampling by a neutral third party. As a result, dispute

176. See Fox Ins. Co. v. Ctrs. Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 715 F.3d 1211, 1217–19 (9th
Cir. 2013) (describing procedural rights afforded terminated Part D insurer); cf. Nicholas
Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2014)
(discussing the presumption of judicial review of agency action).
177. E.g., Illinois Council on Long Term Care v. Shalala, 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000) (discussing
“presumption against preclusion of judicial review” in context of Medicare provider suit for
benefits); Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 667 (1986) (same).
178. See Fox, 715 F.3d at 1222 (describing procedural rights afforded terminated Part D
insurer).
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resolution process should not be presumptively available in these areas if the insurers
would be willing to go without.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has already tentatively come to
this conclusion in a very limited area, by providing that hospitals have no right to
challenge the decision to reopen payment determinations (although they do have the
right to challenge the decision made on reopening).179 When challenged, the Ninth
Circuit upheld this policy, noting and deferring to the CMS’s determination that ex
ante auditing of recovery audit contractors—the entities that make reopening
determinations—was a superior means of error prevention than a claimant-driven
dispute resolution process.180 The argument of this section is that the CMS was right
in that case, and that it should explore limiting provider and insurer rights to judicial
review of individualized determinations in other areas.
There are three reasons to doubt the superiority of dispute resolution process as a
tool of error reduction in paying Medicare contractors. First, dispute resolution in
this context is a biased error reducer. Because companies only appeal errors that hurt
them, false positives are never identified through the dispute resolution process.
(Note that this bias could also be corrected by giving some entity the incentive and
ability to discover and challenge through the dispute resolution process payment
errors in favor of providers or insurers, but such a rule could create its own problems,
as seen in the Recovery Audit Contractor program that has recently been the subject
of controversy in the Medicare Part A context.)181
Second, dispute resolution is a costly means of error identification and
correction.182 Third, because the government processes a high volume of Medicare
payment claims each year (and will process a high volume of claims from insurers
participating on the exchanges), a certain number of errors is not only inevitable but
desirable.183 Unlike other tools of error reduction, such as auditing, dispute resolution
process is not capable of error tolerance; it looks at determinations one at a time, and
so provides a costly route by which even otherwise desirable errors are identified and
corrected. Whether error reduction is ever most cost-effectively accomplished by
hearings in Medicare is beyond the scope of this Article. But the preceding discussion
offers reason for doubt. Wherever policymakers conclude that other means would be
more cost-effective, they should consider conditioning participation in Medicare on
a company’s agreement to be subject to such means.

179. See Palomar Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 693 F.3d 1151, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2012).
180. Id. at 1165.
181. See Sandra M. Terra, Regulatory Issues: Recovery Audit Contractors and Their
Impact on Case Management, 14 PROF. CASE MGMT. 217 (2009).
182. See supra Part I.
183. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 157 (1987) (stating that the “Secretary faces an
administrative task of staggering proportions” in processing benefit claims and “[p]erfection
in processing millions of such claims annually is impossible”); Mercer v. Birchman, 700 F.2d
828, 835 (2nd Cir. 1983) (“It has never been expected that” a “vast” claims-processing
department of government “can achieve absolute procedural perfection.”).
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3. Deontological Justifications
Deontological justifications for dispute resolution process have diminished
applicability to businesses that administer Medicare. If a business entity would be
willing to attempt to earn a profit by assisting in the provision of
government-subsidized healthcare whether or not they are afforded a right to ex post
dispute resolution process, then why should such a right be afforded if it does not
serve consequentialist ends?
This question is especially pronounced in the Medicare Part D context, where
insurers compete to serve in the program by submitting premium bids to the
government. Companies could incorporate the lost “value” of dispute resolution
process in their premium bids, and those companies that did not value such process
would have a competitive advantage. Such an arrangement would be a contrast to the
current approach, which automatically gives all companies a right to dispute
resolution process, benefitting those companies that are able to extract the most value
out of the taxpayers through use of that process.
CONCLUSION
This Article has offered an improved understanding of the value of process and,
with it, a new explanation of when procedural rules should be made mandatory.
Specifically, it has shown that people might fail to appreciate the potential value of
a “day in court,” either by failing to anticipate that they may be bitterly disappointed
by a potential outcome or by failing to anticipate that simply being heard could
soothe that disappointment. Because laws making procedural rules mandatory are
not as liberty-restricting as more run-of-the-mill mandates—they leave one party a
meaningful choice ex post that he might otherwise have mistakenly given away ex
ante—the possibility of such market failure makes process mandates justifiable in a
wider range of contexts than more ordinary mandates.

